Foundations of Cooperation in the Commons: Difference between revisions
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This meeting will bring together economists, behavioral scientists, ecologists, mathematicians and modelers, to address still open questions on the “tragedy of the commons” problem. The origins of the problem of cooperation involve the understanding of the interactions and co-dependence between the formal and informal rules of the game, and the individuals’ preferences with respect to time, perception of risk, the environment and other human beings. The group of scientists invited will bring a series of novel approaches to these questions, and applied to various domains that touch the problem of collective action and cooperation. | This meeting will bring together economists, behavioral scientists, ecologists, mathematicians and modelers, to address still open questions on the “tragedy of the commons” problem. The origins of the problem of cooperation involve the understanding of the interactions and co-dependence between the formal and informal rules of the game, and the individuals’ preferences with respect to time, perception of risk, the environment and other human beings. The group of scientists invited will bring a series of novel approaches to these questions, and applied to various domains that touch the problem of collective action and cooperation. | ||
Revision as of 19:01, 3 February 2006
| Cooperation in the Commons |
Foundations of Cooperation in the Commons
February 9 to 11, 2006
Universidad de Los Andes, Bogota
Welcome
This meeting will bring together economists, behavioral scientists, ecologists, mathematicians and modelers, to address still open questions on the “tragedy of the commons” problem. The origins of the problem of cooperation involve the understanding of the interactions and co-dependence between the formal and informal rules of the game, and the individuals’ preferences with respect to time, perception of risk, the environment and other human beings. The group of scientists invited will bring a series of novel approaches to these questions, and applied to various domains that touch the problem of collective action and cooperation.