Economic inequality, kinship networks, and political transitions project page

Summary

In this project we will build on concepts presented in the paper The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002. Acemoglu and Robinson build a theoretical (analytical) model that explains the main different patterns inequality has followed along the development of different countries, a Kuznets curve, the autocratic disaster and the east Asian miracle which depend on the concrete political pattern, determined initial level of inequality and degree of organization of civil society. Other countries fail to observe similar patterns because of persistence of inequality or difficulties of relatively organized civil society to revolt against elite.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2002. “The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve.” Review of Development Economics 6 (2): 183–203.

Abstract. The paper provides a political economy theory of the Kuznets curve. When development leads to increasing inequality, this can induce political instability and force democratization on political elites. Democratization leads to institutional changes which encourage redistribution and reduce inequality (1. Development = inequality = instability = democratization = redistribution 2. Also, disaster = status quo or unorganized society). Nevertheless, development does not necessarily induce a Kuznets curve, and it is shown that development may be associated with two types of nondemocratic paths: an “autocratic disaster,” with high inequality and low output, and an “East Asian Miracle,” with low inequality and high output. These arise either because 1. Inequality does not increase with development, or because the degree of 2. Political mobilization is low. Better understanding of cases not covered in the theory as highlighted in the paper.

Members

Heath (hendersonhl@gmail.com)
Bernardo
Catherine
James G.
Francesca
Brais
Claudius

Objectives

In this project we plan to develop an agent-based model to capture some of the complexities of the system and investigate the affects of these on the emergent political system.

We aim to end up with one agent-based model which captures at least one 'reality' that is not captured in the previous model and apply the model to a case study.

From this we will infer the benefits of representing systems in this way and hope to answer questions such as:

Can an agent-based model explain the transitions in other countries?
Is it useful to include additional data and modelling in policy decisions, or do 'simple' analytical models suffice? This is interesting from the point of view of the resources needed to understand these issues.

Methods

We will formalise the work of Acemoglu as an agent-based model and introduce heterogeneous agents and complex behaviour in terms of peer interactions.

Steps in the modelling process:
1. Formalise the Acemoglu model in an agent-based framework and validate results from their paper

2. Move from homogeneous agents to heterogeneous agents
a. Introduce a continuous distribution of wealth (cf all agents having the same preferences)
b. Introduce realistic familial institutions for transferring values
c. Introduce a peer network where agents can aligning with preferences of peers (horizontal influence)

3. Apply the new model to a case study. can we use our model to explain political transitions in countries that cannot be explained with the analytical model?