Difference between revisions of "Reasoning, Perception and Beliefs in Strategic Settings: Theory, Behavior and Cognition"

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<h3>Aims and Scope</h3>
{{Reasoning, Perception and Beliefs in Strategic Settings: Theory, Behavior and Cognition}}
<p> While game theory, the theory that analyzes purposive behavior
in strategic settings, has had notable successes in predicting
behavior in some cases, the theory fails to provide an accurate
prediction in a large class of real-life situations as well as
experimental settings. The conundrum that still plagues game
theory today, 65 years after the publication of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern's book that set off the field, is how individuals
perceive strategic situations, reason about others, and form
beliefs about others' perceptions, reasoning processes and
beliefs. That is, the interactive nature of strategic settings
makes the problem of predicting behavior in such settings
fundamentally more difficult than that of predicting choice
behavior in single-person decision problems, where ideas and
concepts from psychology have been incorporated into general
theories with considerable success.</p>
<p>Adaptations to the theory based on experimental evidence on
behavior have led to better predictions in some settings, but
have failed to provide a general theory based on intuitive and
basic principles. At the same time, a good understanding of how
evidence on human cognition can be incorporated into
game-theoretic models is still lacking. For instance, can we
use evidence on human cognition to develop models of bounded
rationality in games? Is it possible to use experimental
results on people's Theory of Mind&mdash;the mechanism that people
use to infer and reason about others' state of mind&mdash;to
provide better predictions of human behavior?</p>
<p>This working group aims to revisit the fundamental assumptions
underlying game theory, in particular questioning the
modeling of individuals' representations, reasoning processes
and beliefs, with an eye towards empirical evidence of human
behavior as well as on cognitive processes. It does so by
bringing together game theorists (in particular epistemic game
theory and learning), decision theorists, cognitive
neuroscientists, psychologists, and computer scientists, to
discuss problems of joint interests, and to confront
perspectives. Presentations are scheduled in such a way that
there will be ample time for discussion among the select group
of invitees.</p>
<h3>Confirmed Participants</h3>
<LI> [ Larry Blume] (Cornell)
<LI> [ Ehud Kalai] (Northwestern University)
<LI> [ Willemien Kets] (Santa Fe Institute)
<LI> [ Bart Lipman] (Boston University)
<LI> [ Friederike Mengel] (Maastricht University)
<LI> [ Jason Mitchell] (Harvard)
<LI> [ Rafael Pass] (Cornell)
<LI> Alex Peysakhovich (Harvard)
<LI> [ Aldo Rustichini] (University of Minnesota)
<LI> [ Rebecca Saxe] (MIT)
<LI> [ Elias Tsakas] (Maastricht University)
<h3>Presentations and speaker information</h3>
The working group runs from Friday, June 4 till Monday, June 7
(with a welcome reception on Thursday evening, June 3).
Participants are asked to give a presentation on recent work
related to the topic of the working group. Each presentation
lasts 1.5 hour, including discussion; since there is likely be
much discussion, speakers should expect to have no more than 1
hour for their presentation. Since participants come from a
variety of backgrounds, participants are asked to provide a
brief bio with information on their background and research
interests. Participants can also select one or two papers to
share with other participants. A bio and any background reading
can be send to the organizer, Willemien Kets

Latest revision as of 16:23, 3 May 2010

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