Emergence of Consciousness Page
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I created this page to share and discuss our models for the emergence of consciousness from matter. Please share your models and add discussion so we can all see and think about it. We will use this page in the end to write up a summary and hopefully compare and contrast the models and discuss what properties of consciousness can be explained by what model.
Thanks, Alireza
Working Ideas
(1) Consciousness as Hyper Attractors of Brain (Alireza)
In this schema states of our mind/consciousness as attractors of the dynamics that arise from our brain. We receive sensory information that act as perturbations pushing the trajectory out of a basin of attractor and into a new basin.
= (2) Reference! Tegmark - The fourth state of matter
This can be an interesting starting point... at least one perspective on the topic http://arxiv.org/pdf/1401.1219v2.pdf Sarah
Perspective Summaries
Sean Hayes
The Hard Problem of Consciousness
- This paper makes the important distinction between the 'easy' and 'hard' problems of consciousness in relative terms. I think it would be useful to use this framework to focus the precise problems we're investigating around consciousness.
My definition for consciousness at it's simplest form is just having subjective experience. While some of the discussion this afternoon touched on integrative brain problems (which falls under 'easy' problems of consciousness in the above, as a way to describe issues of cognition), my question is whether this property of consciousness is an emergent phenomenon. While this is difficult to address objectively, I think it can be approached from our perspectives by comparing consciousness with other emergent phenomena.
The big question that I've been trying to resolve myself along this line of thinking is related to the 'binding problem' (1,2). I'm probably bastardizing the definition a bit, but essentially the issue is conscious experience is not a distributed phenomenon but rather that experience is inherently singular - to me this is entirely distinct from emergence, which is inherently a distributed feature of a complex system. Moreover, our conscious experience not only receives input from the complex, distributed network of our brain, but itself can cause changes in brain behavior and function. Is this actually an emergent phenomenon, or the concentration of information into a centralized control (our subjective experience)? Are there characteristics of subjective experience which do act the way we expect emergent phenomena to behave?
Cole Mathis
I think that consciousness is an Emergent property of the electro-chemical interactions occurring in my brain. The difficulty in understanding the dynamics and/or the origin of consciousness is (in my opinion) the hard problem in emergence: how can macroscopic features of the system have causal control of the microscopic degrees of freedom? One of the canonical examples of emergent phenomena is the emergence of thermodynamics from statistical mechanics. Here the behavior of a system with many degrees of freedom (an ideal gas) can be effectively represented using bulk (emergent) variables (temperature, pressure, volume, etc.) This example is great but it says nothing about the flow of information in the system or the casual direction. For example consider a box of an ideal gas, if I hold the volume constant and heat this box, the pressure will go up. An increase in pressure on the macro scale corresponds to an increase in the average speed of the particles on the microscopic scale, however we do not say that the increased pressure caused the increase in the average speed (although we might say that the increase of the average translational kinetic energy caused the increase in pressure). In this system the causal arrow points only from the micro-scale to the macro-scale. With consciousness we have exactly the opposite situation. If the state of my neurons are the microscopic state variables and my conscious thoughts are the macroscopic variables, then when I think about typing, the macroscopic variables configure the microscopic variables in just the right way to send signals down to fingers, my fingers didn’t start typing and then cause my brain to think about typing (I hope.) So here the causal direction is reversed. How did this reversal/ asymmetry arise and how can we generalize this notion?