Games and nets literature review

Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E. & Nowak, M.A. A simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks. Nature 441: 502-505 (2006). pdf

This is a simple exploration of how network structure -- in particular, connectedness -- affects the evolution of cooperation. They find that a good predictor for whether cooperation can invade and spread in a network is whether the benefit-cost ratio is greater than the (average) degree of the graph. They derive the result exactly for a cycle, approximately for a random graph where every node has the same degree, and use simulation to show that the fit is good for true random graphs and scale-free networks.

Santos, F.C., Pacheco, J.M. & Lenaerts T. Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations. Proc Nat Acad Sci USA 103: 3490-3494 (2006). pdf

The authors show that heterogeneity in the degree of the graph (e.g. scale-free networks as opposed to single-scale networks) can encourage the evolution of cooperation. They simulate using what amounts to an imitation rule on a fixed network structure, and parameterize the game that is played so that it can represent three popular games: Stag Hunt, Hawk-Dove, and Prisoner's Dilemma.

Back to games and nets group