Networks Coalitions and Revolutions

Setup (to be discussed)

We want to study a situation of overlapping networks, in which the dynamics of one (or more) networks influence the topology of the network that portrays the social stratification (directed, weighted network?) of a country.

Possible networks that could play a role are:

• Family
• Geography
• Job
• Recreation
• Political opinion, and of course
• Social stratficiation.

Possibly/probably not all networks will be implemented in the first version of the model.

Possible inspiration from Netlogo:

• Revolution

Mechanisms:

• Agents have certain political opinions which they transfer through their networks
• Political opinion should be multi-dimensional (but in the beginning possibly quite simple: pro-contra, violent-peaceful; things start to change if agents get contra+violent)
• At a certain threshold level the stratification is changed, due to agents changing the network (breaking ties with people they disagree with?)
• This will lead to new power structures

Approach: Andreas is in favour of a simple reasoning & exploratory approach. Once we have something going, we may find additional details on revolutionary dynamics to improve the model.

Meetings

Thursday 8PM.

Original ideas

Inductive Game Theory for International Conflict (Thomson McFarland)

One of our lecturers from week 3, Jessica Flack, has a paper out on "Inductive Game Theory" (press release here) that examines interactions between primates to extract strategy spaces that could lead to conflict. I am confident that I have done unspeakable violence to the true character of this research, but, nevertheless, Anna Pechenkina and I are interested in exploring this method and possibly incorporating some data on human international conflict (for example, KEDS/TABARI). Let us know if you'd be interested.

The Importance of Network Structure for the Formation of Coalitions (Vessela Daskalova)

Hi, I'm thinking of investigating which network structures are best for the formation of parties or coalitions under different conditions. One could assume that each agent has a list ranking different policies. If the majority of agents have the same policy as a first priority, a coalition or "party" can be formed. Initially, we could look at how the structure of given networks influences coalition formation. In the longer term this can be also extended to looking at when revolutions, defined as changes in the existing hierarchical structures, occur. Basically, is there a network structure, which is more conducive to being overthrown - why were the French and the Russian revolutions successful, and others not? Anyone interested?