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=Titles and Abstracts= | |||
[http://www.santafe.edu/profiles/?pid=113 Dan Rockmore], External Professor, Santa Fe Institute and Dartmouth College | |||
[http://www.santafe.edu/profiles/?pid=72 David Krakauer], Chair of Faculty and Professor, Santa Fe Institute | |||
'''Modes of Regulation in Biological Evolution: Programs versus Selective Arenas''' | |||
Evolution by natural selection generates ordered states in appropriate environments by moving mutational quasi-species (populations of mutants about a wild-type) towards adaptive optima. This is associated with random variation and the loss of many genomes. By contrast, development is traditionally thought to generate ordered states during a single lifetime by moving growing populations of cells towards phenotypic optima. This is associated with programmed variability among daughter cells and a minimum of cell death. In small organisms (small numbers of cells with low rates of developmental error), development is highly regulated with each cell fate strictly determined. In large organisms with larger rates of error, development re-introduces a form of developmental natural selection into the production of organisms. This developmental form of natural selection is called arena selection. I shall discuss a few of the implications of arena selection for the regulation of complex social systems. Biology tells us that strict forms of regulation are not workable in large populations with large rates of error. However, multiple, carefully controlled selective arenas, can generate robust function. | |||
[http://www.jeffmadrick.com/ Jeff Madrick], The New School | |||
'''Financial Innovation and Deregulation: Double-Edged Swords''' | |||
Since the 1970s, financial innovation has been intense in the U.S. and, partly as a consequence, around the world. But financial innovation has proven time and again to be a two-edged sword. Innovation in finance, as in many biological, geographical and social systems, is encouraged and often highly beneficial—no doubt, critical to survival. In the case of finance, for example, it can significantly reduce the costs of investing, with widely beneficial consequences for the economy. It can also result in advantageous new products that provide lower-risk access for individuals to a variety of investment products. But waves of financial innovation have also almost always ultimately been associated with over-speculation, financial crashes, and economic recessions. This is the case again today. Ironically, innovation in finance is partly the consequence of regulation. Money market funds were created because the interest rates on bank deposits were restricted, for example. But a lack of or loosening of regulations in finance has repeatedly given rise to a tidal wave of innovation that creates severe instability. This occurred in the 1990s and again in the 2000s. Why is this pattern so persistent in the credit and finance markets and not all other markets? Can permanent rules be established to create a balance between constructive innovation and abusive excesses? Or does supervision require shifting, ad hoc application of regulatory tools as conditions inevitably change? My talk will discuss these issues, relying on the history of financial deregulation over the past thirty years as a case study, with particular focus on the events of the last two years. | |||
[http://www.santafe.edu/profiles/?pid=69 Jessica Flack], Research Professor, Santa Fe Institute | |||
'''The Evolutionary and Experimental Logic of Robustness in Biological & Social Systems''' | |||
I will discuss principles for robust design in biological and social organization, focusing on regulatory solutions to perturbations caused by uninformative or misleading fluctuations in component behavior and component conflict, error and failure. I will discuss how the logic of experimental design can reveal the logic of robust evolutionary design. I will illustrate these points through case studies of robustness in the internet, gene regulatory networks, and animal social systems. | |||
[http://www.santafe.edu/profiles/?pid=114 Daniel Schrag], External Professor and Science Board, Santa Fe Institute and Harvard University | |||
'''Regulation and the Environment: Methane and the Tundra''' | |||
Abstract coming soon... | |||
[http://web.mit.edu/alo/www/ Andrew W. Lo], Director, Laboratory for Financial Engineering, MIT | |||
'''Regulation as Adaptation to Behavioral Biases''' | |||
The current financial crisis has renewed political interest in increasing regulatory oversight of financial markets, despite the fact that the banking and insurance industries – two of the most highly regulated industries in the global economy – are at the center of the crisis. In this talk, I will review the basic economics of regulation, as well as the theory of "normal accidents", and provide a new perspective based on the psychology of fear and greed. Although complexity and tight coupling are contributing factors in the current crisis, a third element involving prosperity-induced risk tolerance may be even more significant. I will conclude with some suggestions for incorporating investor psychology directly into financial regulations. | |||
[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/jclippinger John Clippinger], Senior Fellow, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School | |||
'''Finance 3.0: Architecting Trusted, Transparent and Self-Governing Financial Networks''' | |||
The current financial crisis has forced a rethinking of the architecture of the financial system, specifically, how to provide robust trust and transparency, while at the same time, encouraging innovation. Rather than turning to worn out regulatory methods, there may be an opportunity to design into financial networks mechanisms to achieve these goals, such as, auto-auditing, robust reputations, authentication, independent rating, and principled self-governance. I will report on the research at the Law Lab to build a cloud platform to implement and pilot test some of the requisite principles and mechanisms to create trusted, resilient networks and then provide an example of a project at the Law Lab at Harvard to develop digital governance mechanisms for a virtual LLC in Vermont. The final part of my talk will argue for an evolutionary biological and complexity sciences approach to designing digital institutions and agreements appropriate to the complexities of a globally networked environment. Digitalization has radically reduced information asymmetries and the coordination costs for collective action. Hence, we are likely to see fundamentally new forms of collective organization. | |||
[http://www.santafe.edu/events/workshops/images/c/c7/BelkaBio.pdf Sean Belka], Senior Vice President and Director of FCAT | |||
'''Idea Ecosystem''' | |||
Innovation is at the core of serving customers better and creating competitive advantage. Ideas are at the core of innovation. Where do ideas come from? Can you create and manage an "idea ecosystem" to generate more and/or better ideas? If so, how? What would it look like? How would you measure results? This talk will present this concept and propose potential answers to these questions. |
Latest revision as of 15:44, 6 May 2009
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Titles and Abstracts
Dan Rockmore, External Professor, Santa Fe Institute and Dartmouth College
David Krakauer, Chair of Faculty and Professor, Santa Fe Institute
Modes of Regulation in Biological Evolution: Programs versus Selective Arenas
Evolution by natural selection generates ordered states in appropriate environments by moving mutational quasi-species (populations of mutants about a wild-type) towards adaptive optima. This is associated with random variation and the loss of many genomes. By contrast, development is traditionally thought to generate ordered states during a single lifetime by moving growing populations of cells towards phenotypic optima. This is associated with programmed variability among daughter cells and a minimum of cell death. In small organisms (small numbers of cells with low rates of developmental error), development is highly regulated with each cell fate strictly determined. In large organisms with larger rates of error, development re-introduces a form of developmental natural selection into the production of organisms. This developmental form of natural selection is called arena selection. I shall discuss a few of the implications of arena selection for the regulation of complex social systems. Biology tells us that strict forms of regulation are not workable in large populations with large rates of error. However, multiple, carefully controlled selective arenas, can generate robust function.
Jeff Madrick, The New School
Financial Innovation and Deregulation: Double-Edged Swords
Since the 1970s, financial innovation has been intense in the U.S. and, partly as a consequence, around the world. But financial innovation has proven time and again to be a two-edged sword. Innovation in finance, as in many biological, geographical and social systems, is encouraged and often highly beneficial—no doubt, critical to survival. In the case of finance, for example, it can significantly reduce the costs of investing, with widely beneficial consequences for the economy. It can also result in advantageous new products that provide lower-risk access for individuals to a variety of investment products. But waves of financial innovation have also almost always ultimately been associated with over-speculation, financial crashes, and economic recessions. This is the case again today. Ironically, innovation in finance is partly the consequence of regulation. Money market funds were created because the interest rates on bank deposits were restricted, for example. But a lack of or loosening of regulations in finance has repeatedly given rise to a tidal wave of innovation that creates severe instability. This occurred in the 1990s and again in the 2000s. Why is this pattern so persistent in the credit and finance markets and not all other markets? Can permanent rules be established to create a balance between constructive innovation and abusive excesses? Or does supervision require shifting, ad hoc application of regulatory tools as conditions inevitably change? My talk will discuss these issues, relying on the history of financial deregulation over the past thirty years as a case study, with particular focus on the events of the last two years.
Jessica Flack, Research Professor, Santa Fe Institute
The Evolutionary and Experimental Logic of Robustness in Biological & Social Systems
I will discuss principles for robust design in biological and social organization, focusing on regulatory solutions to perturbations caused by uninformative or misleading fluctuations in component behavior and component conflict, error and failure. I will discuss how the logic of experimental design can reveal the logic of robust evolutionary design. I will illustrate these points through case studies of robustness in the internet, gene regulatory networks, and animal social systems.
Daniel Schrag, External Professor and Science Board, Santa Fe Institute and Harvard University
Regulation and the Environment: Methane and the Tundra
Abstract coming soon...
Andrew W. Lo, Director, Laboratory for Financial Engineering, MIT
Regulation as Adaptation to Behavioral Biases
The current financial crisis has renewed political interest in increasing regulatory oversight of financial markets, despite the fact that the banking and insurance industries – two of the most highly regulated industries in the global economy – are at the center of the crisis. In this talk, I will review the basic economics of regulation, as well as the theory of "normal accidents", and provide a new perspective based on the psychology of fear and greed. Although complexity and tight coupling are contributing factors in the current crisis, a third element involving prosperity-induced risk tolerance may be even more significant. I will conclude with some suggestions for incorporating investor psychology directly into financial regulations.
John Clippinger, Senior Fellow, The Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School
Finance 3.0: Architecting Trusted, Transparent and Self-Governing Financial Networks
The current financial crisis has forced a rethinking of the architecture of the financial system, specifically, how to provide robust trust and transparency, while at the same time, encouraging innovation. Rather than turning to worn out regulatory methods, there may be an opportunity to design into financial networks mechanisms to achieve these goals, such as, auto-auditing, robust reputations, authentication, independent rating, and principled self-governance. I will report on the research at the Law Lab to build a cloud platform to implement and pilot test some of the requisite principles and mechanisms to create trusted, resilient networks and then provide an example of a project at the Law Lab at Harvard to develop digital governance mechanisms for a virtual LLC in Vermont. The final part of my talk will argue for an evolutionary biological and complexity sciences approach to designing digital institutions and agreements appropriate to the complexities of a globally networked environment. Digitalization has radically reduced information asymmetries and the coordination costs for collective action. Hence, we are likely to see fundamentally new forms of collective organization.
Sean Belka, Senior Vice President and Director of FCAT
Idea Ecosystem
Innovation is at the core of serving customers better and creating competitive advantage. Ideas are at the core of innovation. Where do ideas come from? Can you create and manage an "idea ecosystem" to generate more and/or better ideas? If so, how? What would it look like? How would you measure results? This talk will present this concept and propose potential answers to these questions.