

Special Issue Proposal for *World Development* Instrumental Incoherence in Institutional Reform

Guest Editor: Jean-Paul Faguet (LSE)

Why is there so much institutional reform in the world? This is a deep conundrum that is little acknowledged and less understood. Why are senior politicians in all the world's regions, across developing and developed countries, and in both democratic and autocratic regimes, so eager to change their institutions? Some recent examples include transitions from constitutional monarchy to republics in Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, and Jamaica; reforms to judicial independence in Israel, Poland and the UK; broad public sector management reforms in New Zealand; new constitutions in Bolivia and Chile; Sri Lanka's transition from a presidential to a parliamentary system; the creation of new states in India and new districts in Uganda; sweeping changes to macroeconomic management and market regulation in Uzbekistan; and decentralization in countries as diverse as Colombia, France, India, Japan, Mexico, Mozambique, Serbia, and South Korea. There are many more.

We follow North (1990) and others in defining institutions as the deep rules of the game that determine how societies are governed, collective decisions taken, and resources mobilized and spent for public purposes. It follows from this definition that reforming institutions is likely to have powerful, long-term consequences across a country's politics, economy, and broader society. That consequences should be broad and deep is implicit in the 'rules of the game' concept. Outcomes that are both long-term and multidimensional will be almost impossible to predict with any accuracy. But political leaders' incentives are widely held to be short-term (Pierson 2004), prioritizing immediate political advantage over uncertain future payoffs. Why, then, are leaders so eager to reform?

Faguet and Shami's (2022) concept of *instrumental incoherence* provides an answer. Leaders often push reforms not for the sake of the first-order effects those reforms might be expected to have, but for their side-effects, which might be orthogonal to their main effects, but which solve some pressing political problem. So, for example, politicians alter electoral systems or decentralize government not to improve the match between voting outcomes and social preferences, or make the state more efficient or responsive, but because they wish to cement a parliamentary coalition, or undermine the opposition. Faguet and Shami characterize a class of institutional reforms marked by serious mismatches between the purported object of reform and the most important problems reformers are actually trying to solve. They then apply this concept to decentralization in Bolivia and Pakistan, analyzing why apparently similar programs had polar-opposite medium and long-term outcomes: reforms eventually abandoned in Pakistan, but significantly deepened in Bolivia until they redefined the country's identity.¹

¹ In 2009 the Republic of Bolivia was officially renamed the Plurinational State of Bolivia.

Current scholarship assumes such mismatches are unsystematic. ‘We know’ that politicians exaggerate, dissemble, and even lie. In analytical terms, our theories treat these untruths as random. But that’s the wrong model. This SI takes the view that politicians dissimulate systematically according to their needs. Their untruths form a pattern in response to identifiable stimuli, with consequences that are also systematic and hence predictable. We can extract useful information from these patterns. Recognizing this allows us to distinguish instrumental incoherence from unintended consequences, which are unforeseen effects that *are* random.

The articles in this SI take up the idea of instrumental incoherence and apply it to a much broader, more important set of powerful institutional reforms across most of Africa and Latin America, as well as India and the UK, over the past 250 years. Twelve original empirical studies explore phenomena as diverse as electoral and campaign finance reform in Chile, how colonial boundaries were constructed across Africa, decentralization in Mexico, gender quotas in India, constitutional reform in Uruguay, the introduction of elected governorships in unitary countries in Latin America, rights-oriented criminal reforms in Venezuela, the switch from French to English as the main medium of instruction in Rwanda, Mexico’s shift to an adversarial criminal justice regime, inverse malapportionments in Argentina’s legislative and executive branches, the Brexit referendum and the UK’s fractious withdrawal from the European Union, and the Jesuit expulsion from colonial Spanish America in 1767.

Beginning in each case with the status quo ante, colleagues analyze the deep political and economic drivers of reform. These insights are used to map leaders’ most pressing political needs onto the specific measures they undertake. Such reform specifics in turn determine the nature of their long-term, often surprising effects on outcomes as diverse as electoral equilibria, gendered marginalization of rural women, the quality of subnational governance and accountability, levels of political instability, police brutality, national integrity, and a set of broad human and economic development outcomes.

The purpose of this Special Issue

Our motivation is, first, to show that the concept of instrumental incoherence travels across large numbers of regions and countries with diverse histories, geographies, political regimes, and economic and social characteristics. The range of contexts in which it can be applied, and the range of phenomena on which it can shed light, are both large. But our more important purpose, through these applications, is to develop and refine the central idea. If Faguet and Shami was a proof of concept, this is a far more ambitious attempt to develop the core theory of instrumental incoherence – to clarify and distil it in a way that renders it more general and more useful as a tool of analysis. For these reasons, we are not wedded to ‘instrumental incoherence’. Indeed, we expect the phrase (and hence our SI title) to evolve as colleagues apply it to a diverse array of development problems.

Contributors are a carefully chosen blend of influential senior figures (e.g. Beatriz Magaloni, Michael Albertus, David Laitin, Kent Eaton, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros) with brilliant young scholars

who in my view have huge potential (e.g. Emily Sellars, Dorothy Kronick, Joan Ricart-Huguet Martha Wilfahrt, Francisco Garfias and Victoria Paniagua). Contributors are also highly diverse in terms of their intellectual and personal backgrounds. Of 23 total authors, eight are women and eight are originally from the Global South. They are social scientists by training, mostly in political science, public policy, economics, area studies, and development studies.

I hope this SI will help our junior colleagues develop as scholars, and we are structuring the process of pulling it together to facilitate that. This proposal is the product of a participative process with much input from contributors, including multiple feedback loops that led to revisions in the countries and themes treated, and even to the author list. Two of the papers (Wilfahrt and Laitin et al.) and seven of the authors were added at the suggestion of junior colleagues. Our timeline (see below) has been specially drawn up to accommodate junior contributors, who often work under greater professional and personal constraints than senior colleagues face. The center-pieces of this process are two in-person workshops scheduled for November 2023 (EUI, Florence) and April 2024 (Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico; I will be a sabbatical visitor at both). These are explicitly designed to blend senior colleagues' experience and wisdom with junior colleagues' innovative energy in a way that hopefully elicits detailed constructive feedback on all 13 papers.

A Development Studies contribution to social science

Finally, we hope the articles in this SI will coalesce into two broad contributions to social science. First, consider where instrumental incoherence sits in purely theoretical terms. It is broadly related to the time inconsistency problem introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1977), which subsequently propagated powerfully through economics and is now an accepted part of that intellectual toolkit.² We argue that time inconsistency is but a special case of the larger, more vexed phenomenon of instrumental incoherence, where the incentives of agents pursuing a change, and the effects of that change, are dissimilar in both time *and dimension*, and at the limit can be wildly asymmetric. This makes instrumental incoherence a more powerful, complex, difficult problem. Its innate multidimensionality renders it problematic for the mathematical tools preferred by economists. By contrast, trade-offs amongst policy dimensions, sectors, social groups, and time scales are the bread-and-butter of development studies, and hence susceptible to our multi-methods toolkit. Characterizing this phenomenon and making it susceptible to empirical investigation is our first contribution.

Secondly, the development studies literature is full of ideas devised by our constituent disciplines to explain rich-country phenomena, which are then re-purposed for developing-country contexts. We seek to break with that in two ways. Our ambition is to forge a powerful concept in the methodologically and empirically diverse fires of development studies, test and perfect it there, and then feed it back into the social science disciplines. And in so doing, we hope to show that an idea that emerges in the developing world can explain some of the most important events in developed countries too.

² See Fischer (1980) and Lucas (1986) for influential overviews of this large field.

Indeed, demonstrating that is one key purpose of the article on Brexit, the only developed-country case in this SI, and perhaps the single clearest example of instrumental incoherence in the world today. The UK's economy and politics continue to stagger through the turmoil that Brexit created. Settled opinion pins responsibility on immigration and the populist right, missing the extent to which it is a self-inflicted, accidental wound that need never have happened. Put crudely, our Brexit analysis is a piece of intellectual reverse colonization that we hope will inspire further colonizations of 'developed-country studies'.

Dr. Jean-Paul Faguet is Professor of the Political Economy of Development at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is Co-Chair (with María López-Urbe and Alberto Díaz-Cayeros) of the LSE-Stanford-Uniandes Conference on Long-Run Development, and Chair of the Decentralization Task Force at Columbia University's Initiative for Policy Dialogue. He works at the frontier between economics and political science, using quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate the institutions and organizational forms that underpin development transformations. He has published in the development, political science, and economics literatures, including *Is Decentralization Good for Development? Perspectives from Academics and Policymakers* (Oxford, 2015), and *Decentralization and Popular Democracy: Governance from Below in Bolivia* (Michigan), which won the W.J.M. Mackenzie Prize for best political science book of 2012.

Professor Faguet's current work focuses on: (i) Historical institutions, inequality, and long-run development in Latin America; (ii) Cleavage collapse and political-party system instability in developing countries; and (iii) The biology and politics of choice in market democracies. He trained in both politics and economics at Princeton, Harvard and the LSE, where his dissertation won the William Robson Memorial Prize. More information available at:

<http://governancefrombelow.net/>

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Abstracts and Author Bios

1. Introduction: The theory of instrumental incoherence and its application across regions and types of institutional reform
 - Jean-Paul Faguet (LSE)

See above.

2. The Unanticipated Consequences of Electoral Reform: Evidence from Chile
 - Michael Albertus (U. of Chicago), Victor Menaldo (U. of Washington), Jorge Rojas-Vallejos (U. Andrés Bello)

More democracy is supposed to reduce polarization and populism. Specifically, a big and influential literature argues that more democracy in terms of reducing electoral barriers to entry and promoting pluralism should increase the quality of democracy. However, in Chile we observe the opposite. First, key electoral and campaign finance reforms that made it easier for parties to form, contest and finance elections, and obtain seats in the legislature, seemingly led to increased polarization, and thus less consensus between and within parties. Second, these reforms incentivized opportunistic political entrepreneurs to form populist parties led by charismatic leaders who had relatively short time horizons and sought to exploit reduced barriers to political competition. We document this pattern in Chile between 2015 and 2023 around major legislative bills. We also explain the mechanism by which these reforms led to polarization and populism and formalize the logic, as well as provide qualitative evidence to support the model's empirical implications.

Michael Albertus is professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. His research examines democracy and dictatorship, inequality and redistribution, property rights, and civil conflict. His most recent book, *Property Without Rights: Origins and Consequences of the Property Rights Gap* (Cambridge, 2021) examines why governments that implement land reform programs only rarely grant property rights to beneficiaries and how that impacts development and inclusion. Albertus' work has been published in the *American Journal of Political Science*, *Journal of Politics*, *World Politics*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Development Economics*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Development*, and elsewhere.

Victor Menaldo is Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington and is affiliated with the Center for Statistics and the Social Sciences (CSSS), Near and Middle Eastern Studies, and the Center for Environmental Politics. He co-founded and co-leads the UW Political Economy Forum. He specializes in comparative politics and political economy and is interested in the political economy of property rights, industrialization, innovation, liberal democracy, and development. He has two books are *The Institutions Curse* (Cambridge, 2016) and *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy* (with Mike Albertus), also Cambridge (2018).

Jorge Rojas-Vallejos is Assistant Professor at the Universidad Andrés Bello (UNAB) in Santiago, Chile, Chief Economist at the Foundation for Equitable Growth (Fundación Economía y Equidad), and Economic Adviser at the Chilean Congress. He specializes in macroeconomic theory and development economics and is interested in applications of game theory to partisan politics. He has published articles in the *Journal of Development Economics*, *Energy Policy*, *Open Economies Review*, and the *International Journal of Game Theory*.

3. When Inclusive Reforms End up Reinforcing Regressive Social Institutions: The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Quotas for Women in Rural India
 - Rachel Brulé (Boston U.), Alyssa Heinze (UC Berkeley) and Simon Chauchard (U. Carlos III Madrid)

Over the past several decades, the majority of the world's countries have taken up quotas to fill the persistent dearth in women's political representation. In India, constitutional Amendments implemented nationally in 1993 mandate quotas to guarantee representation by traditionally excluded genders (women) and castes (members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes) as heads of local, elected governments. Thanks to this remarkable institutional innovation – whose effects are explored in books by Thomas Bohlken (2016), Chauchard (2017), Jensenius (2017), and Brulé (2020a) – an unprecedented number of individuals from traditionally-excluded groups have been elected, despite persistent discrimination and violence against members of these groups.

Yet presence in institutions neither guarantees voice in decision-making processes nor influence over outcomes. Gender gaps in voice and influence remain common in group settings. To what extent do quotas have unintended consequences that actually *magnify* the political marginalization of the groups whom they enable to enter office? Here, we explore the impact of quotas on three alternative institutions which are typically gender-regressive: families, bureaucrats, and political parties. Indeed, our quantitative and qualitative analysis of 605 village governments in Maharashtra, India suggests that quotas do have unintended consequences: amplifying power for these three institutions whose contemporary structure serves to enforce patriarchal constraints. The end result is often, albeit not always, an increase in women's political marginalization in the presence of women's quotas. We explore the nature and dynamics of these unintended consequences here.

We define “gendered political marginalization” as a type of democratic governance in which members of typically excluded genders – women elected officials – do not have equal input into collective decision-making in comparison to men, and as a result do not have equal influence over outcomes. Here, we study what may be a crucial unintended consequence of quotas meant to ameliorate gender gaps in political representation: to amplify gendered political marginalization *after elections*.

We consider how gender quotas interact with these three sets of alternative institutions, each of which enforce gendered hierarchies of power that enforce male dominance: patriarchal families, bureaucracies, and political parties. We leverage quantitative and qualitative data to map the dynamics of each institution in the absence and presence of quotas for women elected local officials. Broadly speaking, we argue that the design of political institutions matters for political equality. Institutions, which structure the “rules of the game in society,” can either encourage or discourage cooperation (Levi 1988; North 1990). Path-breaking work not only documents a gender gap in political authority (Cruz and Tolentino 2019), but also identifies the ability of institutional changes to ameliorate it (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014). We test the impact of gender quotas and of related bureaucratic quotas across 605 villages in the state of Maharashtra, complemented by qualitative data compiled based upon over a year of field research. In line with our theory, our results clarify the scope as well as the variation in the unintended consequences of quotas. We find that gender quotas, while they guarantee women’s presence in office, also frequently amplify the power of the alternative patriarchal institutions that we investigate: families, bureaucrats, and political parties.

Rachel Brulé is Assistant Professor of Global Development Policy in the Pardee School of Global Studies and Graduate Faculty in Political Science at Boston University.

Alyssa Heinze is a Political Science PhD Student at the University of California, Berkeley.

Simon Chauchard is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Social Sciences Department, University Carlos 3 Madrid, Investigador Distinguido at the Instituto Carlos 3 Juan March (IC3JM), and Director of the Polarization, Identity and Misinformation Lab (PIMlab) at IC3JM.

4. Virtuous outcomes of instrumental intentions? The case of Uruguay’s 1996 Constitutional reform
 - Felipe Carozzi (LSE) and Germán Bidegain (U. de la República)

In December 1996 a national referendum approved a constitutional reform that introduced substantial changes to Uruguay’s electoral system. Among several innovations, the reform substituted the first-past-the-post presidential election system with a two-round system (*ballotage*). We provide evidence that this reform was proposed by Uruguay’s establishment parties to prevent the likely rise to power of the left-wing Frente Amplio in the 1999 elections. As expected, Frente Amplio went on to win a plurality of votes in the first round of those elections, but the institutional rules established by the reform allowed the two historical right-wing parties to join forces in the second round and reach the presidency. Interestingly, in 2002 the elected coalition government faced the harshest economic crisis of the country’s modern history, leading to a Frente Amplio watershed victory in the 2004 elections. The left-wing party obtained a majority of votes in the first round of those elections, making the *ballotage* unnecessary. As a result, it gained the presidency and the absolute majority in both legislative chambers.

In this paper we argue that, while successful in its short-term instrumental goal, the 1996 constitutional reform unintentionally paved the way for a long, three-term period (2005-2020) of Frente Amplio rule. It also facilitated the coalition formation process within the centre-right coalition in the last decade. In the pursuit of a short-term electoral victory, proponent parties created an institutional setting that would support Uruguay's transition to a new political landscape in the first quarter of the XXI century.

Felipe Carozzi is Associate Professor at the London School of Economics. He is also an affiliate of the Centre for Economic Performance and of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research covers the fields of urban and political economics. His work in political economics focuses on issues of coalition formation and survival as well as distributive politics. His articles have been featured in the *Journal of Public Economics*, *the Journal of the European Economic Association*, *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* and the *Journal of the Latin American Economic Association*, among other outlets.

Germán Bidegain is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Universidad de la República and member of the National System of Researchers (Uruguay). He holds a PhD degree in Political Science (Pontificia Universidad Católica of Chile) and an MA in History and Political Theory (Sciences Po Paris). His research interests include comparative politics, democracy, and contentious politics, with a focus on Latin America. His research has been published in several outlets, such as *Partecipazione e Conflitto*, *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée*, *Latin American Politics and Society*, *Revista de Ciencia Política*, *Íconos*, *CJLACS*, *Colombia Internacional* and *Sociologias*.

5. Instrumental incoherence and the emergence of Morena out of Mexico's failed decentralization reform
– Alberto Díaz-Cayeros (Stanford)

This paper uses the notion of “instrumental incoherence” to study three decades of institutional reform, seeking to decentralize resources and functions to municipal governments in Mexico (1990-2020). The crucial question to be addressed is to understand why the Mexican decentralization process, designed by a technocratic vision seeking to create a Wicksellian connection between public good provision and fiscal revenue to finance them at the local level, largely failed. I argue that the failure was an unintended consequence of events related to the war on drug trafficking, that led local officials to calculate their political survival on the basis of their accommodation to the threats of criminal organizations (as suggested by Trejo and Ley, 2020), rather than their progressive ambition within the national party system. I hypothesize that this process is distinct from an unsystematic institutional incoherence, produced by the multiplication of partisan alignments across levels of government, which in turn allowed national politicians, and in particular Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) to find an instrumental use of this subnational incoherence. AMLO created a powerful political organization, the *Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional*, **Morena**, that is not really a

movement, and perhaps neither a political party, but that has become the dominant force in Mexican politics, displacing the traditional party system.

Albert Díaz-Cayeros is Senior Fellow at the Center on Democracy, Development and Rule of Law (CDDRL) and Director of the Center for Latin American Studies at Stanford University. Alberto obtained his PhD in Political Science from Duke University and a BA in Economics from ITAM. He has taught at UCLA and UCSD, where he directed the Center for US Mexico Studies. His research interests include federalism, poverty relief, cartography, indigenous governance, political economy of health, violence and citizen security in Mexico and Latin America.

6. Electing Governors: The Causes and Consequences of Regional Elections in Unitary Countries
– Kent Eaton (UC Santa Cruz)

For a whole host of good reasons, unitary countries around the world are experimenting with reforms that strengthen their regional governments – the intermediate level between national and local governments that we tend to associate with federal rather than unitary systems. As federalism remains a “bridge too far” for many unitary countries (which remain far more numerous in the world today than federal countries), the introduction of direct elections for the chief executives of regional governments (henceforth “governors”) has emerged as a popular reform to derive some of the presumed benefits of political decentralization without formally federalizing.

While the introduction of regional elections is often couched in the language of improving accountability or promoting economic development, in practice it is usually adopted by politicians as a solution to very short-term political problems. Driven by immediate political imperatives, the decision to elect rather than appoint governors is nevertheless a highly significant institutional reform with the potential to profoundly disrupt entrenched political relationships, generating unforeseen and long-term consequences at the national, regional, and local levels of government.

As a case study of the incoherence of institutional reform, this paper focuses on the four unitary countries in Latin America that, over the course of the past three decades, have introduced gubernatorial elections (Colombia in 1992, Peru in 2002, Bolivia in 2005, and Chile in 2016). Although national politicians in each country ostensibly made the same decision in surrendering the right to appoint governors, when we examine the specific design choices they made, as well as the institutional venues in which they were made, it becomes clear that quite different political objectives animated the otherwise common decision to introduce regional elections. In other words, regional elections were introduced in all four cases, but the countries differed in terms of a myriad of other design choices, including the selection of the specific electoral rules that would be used to elect the governors, as well as the administrative and fiscal powers with which they were endowed. The first objective of this paper will be to explain variation in these institutional design choices with respect to the very different political drivers

that were most significant in the push to introduce gubernatorial elections. These include the attempt to end a civil war (Colombia), to signal change from an authoritarian predecessor (Peru), to undercut secessionist pressures and ideological opponents (Bolivia), and to re-direct anti-system protests into institutional channels (Chile). The second objective of this paper will be to trace the impact of these different design choices over time, which have had a longer time to accrue in some cases (e.g. Colombia) than in others (e.g. Chile).

Kent Eaton is Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz and author of *Territory and Ideology in Latin America: Policy Conflicts between National and Subnational Governments* (Oxford University Press, 2017). His research examines the interplay between politics and territory, focusing on the territorial (re)organization of states around the world today. He is also the co-author of *The Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms* (World Bank, 2010) and *The Democratic Decentralization Programming Handbook* (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2021).

7. The Unintended Revolution: Brexit and Instrumental Incoherence – Jonathan Hopkin (LSE)

Brexit has been widely seen as a bad move for the political and economic interests of the UK, but nonetheless firmly grounded in the longstanding Euroskepticism of the British electorate, the peculiarities of the British growth model or the constitutional incompatibility of the UK political system with the institutional structure of the European Union. This paper will argue instead that is the unintended and unexpected outcome of a series of strategic political choices driven by short-term manoeuvrings of party leaders seeking to secure control over their parties. In a context of high institutional malleability, a fortuitous convergence of events in the two main political parties opened up a space for Brexit's proponents to first win the referendum and then ensure that the resulting political impasse was resolved in favour of the 'hard Brexit' option. This outcome was at odds with the preferences of the leadership groups of almost all the political parties, most of the business and financial community, and even large numbers (perhaps even a majority) of British voters. The paper shows how the Conservative leader Cameron's attempt to isolate the euroskeptic wing of his party, combined with the Labour leader Milliband's decision to open up leadership elections to a membership vote, created an opportunity for British voters to use the Brexit referendum as a protest vote against austerity measures following the global financial crisis. This delivered the British political elite an unwanted mandate that it was incapable of translating into policy, generating an impasse that favoured another short-term solution: a general election in which the mandate for a hard Brexit only required a plurality, rather than a majority of votes. Although the institutional flexibility and low bar for radical change of the British constitution provided the context in which this undesirable outcome emerged, Brexit would not have happened in the absence of the internal dysfunctions of its main political parties. The implication of Brexit is that political systems with few veto points and weak representative institutions can set in motion uncontrollable processes that frustrate voters, organized interests, and political elites.

Jonathan Hopkin is Professor of Comparative Politics in the European Institute and the Department of Government at the London School of Economics. He is the author of *Party Formation and Democratic Transition in Spain* (1999, Macmillan) and *Anti-System Politics* (2020, Oxford University Press) and has published widely on the party politics and political economy of Europe in journals such as the *European Journal of Political Research*, *Governance*, *International Political Science Review*, *Journal of European Public Policy*, *New Political Economy*, *Review of International Political Economy*, *Party Politics*, *Politics and Society* and *West European Politics*.

8. Official Vigilantism: Criminal justice reform in Venezuela
– Dorothy Kronick (UC Berkeley) and Rebecca Hanson (U. of Florida)

Police violence is typically understood as the consequence of a repressive state. We argue instead that, in many cases, police commit violence when they deem the state insufficiently repressive. Official vigilantism can therefore arise as an unintended consequence of rights-oriented criminal justice reform. We provide empirical evidence of this dynamic by studying a sharp reform in Venezuela. When a new code of criminal procedure strengthened protections for suspects and defendants, police responded—in a small percentage of cases—by killing those whom they could no longer arrest or detain. We document this response in mortality microdata, contemporary press accounts, and original interviews, providing additional evidence for the mechanism in a survey experiment among police officers in Caracas. Our findings suggest that criminal justice reform can paradoxically spark official vigilantism when police agency objectives conflict with reform goals.

Dorothy Kronick is Assistant Professor of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. She studies Latin American politics, focusing on Venezuelan politics, crime and policing, and competitive authoritarianism. Her work has been published in the *American Political Science Review*, the *Journal of Politics*, *International Organization*, the *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, among others. Her commentary on Venezuelan politics has been published in the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*. Dorothy holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and an M.A. in Economics from Stanford University. Prior to joining Berkeley, she taught at the University of Pennsylvania.

Rebecca Hanson is Assistant Professor at the University of Florida, with appointments in the Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law and the Center for Latin American Studies. She has conducted research on participatory democratic neighborhood experiments, socialist ideology in Venezuela, civilian police reform, police militarization and its impacts on organized crime, and the effects of police-community meetings on citizen attitudes and police behavior. Dr. Hanson's other area of research analyzes sexual harassment and ethnographic fieldwork. Her research has been published in the *Journal of Latin American Studies*, *Crime, Law, and Social Change*, and *Sociological Forum*, among others.

9. Switching to English in Rwanda's Educational Curriculum: Estimating the Return on Investment
 - David Laitin (Stanford), Rajesh Ramachandran (Monash U. Malaysia) and Elijah Scott (Stanford)

In 2008, Rwanda replaced French with English as the medium of instruction for secondary and higher education. The primary justification for this policy change was centered on economic development, as English is seen as a requirement for active participation in the global economy. Additionally, English is seen as key to Rwanda's regional and global integration, including its joining of the East African Community and the Commonwealth, with the hope that an English-literate population would bolster trade, development, and investment. However, these benefits require that the population can effectively acquire human capital in English despite having little knowledge and exposure to the language in daily life. On the proposed justifications, neighboring Burundi, sticking with French, had superior outcomes on the development of human capital.

David Laitin is the James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science in the School of Humanities and Science at Stanford University. He is a comparative politics scholar who has written works on civil war, ethnic identity, culture, and nationalism.

Rajesh Ramachandran is Senior Lecturer, Department of Economics, Monash University, Malaysia. He obtained his Ph.D. at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His principal areas of research lie at the intersection of development economics and its political economy. His primary research interests include political linguistics, economics of discrimination, economics of education, institutional economics, and social identity.

Elijah Scott is a PhD student in political science at Stanford University with interests in comparative politics and American politics

10. From inquisitorial to adversarial criminal justice: Police brutality and due process in Mexico
 - Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford)

I examine the effect of the criminal justice reform in Mexico, which changed the system from an inquisitorial regime existing since the Colonial era to an adversarial regime. Through a multi-method design, I study how it has impacted police brutality, especially using torture to extract confessions and other abuses of due process, including holding suspects incommunicado. I inquire if police are switching from torturing criminals to planting evidence, and also if crime rates have increased as a result of the reform, which makes it significantly harder for police to use torture as a method of criminal prosecution. I document that the reform increased incentives for police to use other methods – including the planting of evidence – to convict suspects.

Beatriz Magaloni is Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and director of the Poverty, Violence and Governance Lab. Most of her current work focuses on state repression, police, human rights, and violence. Her first book, *Voting for Autocracy*, won APSA's best book awards for comparative democratization and the Leon Epstein award for best book on political parties. Her work has appeared in the *American Political Science Review*, *American Journal of Political Science*, *World Development*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Latin American Research Review* and other journals. She holds a Ph.D. in political science (Duke) and a law degree (ITAM).

11. Representation in the Legislature and the Executive as Substitutes? Evidence from Political Elites in Argentina

– Victoria Paniagua (LSE) and Joan Ricart-Huguet (Loyola U. Maryland)

Existing research finds that legislative malapportionment is the result of a credible commitment between elites from peripheral (smaller, rural) regions and elites from core (larger, urban) regions that over-represents the former. This type of agreement is usually instigated at critical junctures, such as the birth of federations and constitutional conventions. An agreement that increases the influence of smaller regions can allay fears that they will become politically irrelevant and also prevent the country's alignment with economic policies preferred by urban elites, thus reducing the incentives of peripheral regions to break away or challenge the center. However, little attention has been paid to whether this agreement influences the composition of the cabinet.

Does legislative over-representation of rural regions extend into executive over-representation, such that they are complements? Or are legislative malapportionment and cabinet malapportionment substitutes instead, such that over-representation in one branch compensates for under-representation in the other? To answer this question, we construct a novel biographical dataset of all Argentinian ministers and legislators from the country's foundation until today (1854-2019), including detailed information on individuals' province and town of origin, political affiliation, and roles in the public sector. Leveraging this data, we first confirm that the malapportionment promoted by 19th century landed elites has led rural provinces to be over-represented in the legislature throughout Argentina's history. This distortion of legislative representation is arguably an example of both coming-together and holding-together federalism insofar as it facilitated both the creation of Argentina 1853 (coming-together) and its continued existence as one state (holding-together).

Second, we show that existing literature on legislative malapportionment has missed the other half of the story: cabinet malapportionment. Buenos Aires, the federal and urban hegemon, has been over-represented in the cabinet throughout Argentina's history, counteracting its under-representation in the legislative branch. This appears institutionally incoherent at first insofar as there is a mismatch between the distribution of power in the two branches, the executive and the legislative. In reality, we argue, the historical evidence is consistent with the view that presidents and ruling elites, largely hailing from Buenos Aires, systematically favored Buenos

Aires in the branch where representation was not legally codified. In other words, the main effect of the institutional reforms that gave birth to federal Argentina was to over-represent the periphery in the legislature. The side effect, however, was for Buenos Aires to control the cabinet, a branch where provincial representation is not explicitly or legally negotiated. We investigate three possible mechanisms that allow Buenos Aires to compensate its legislative disadvantage via the cabinet: an informal pact among elites, social networks, and human capital. Our findings illuminate the formal and informal dynamics of compensation commitments among elites from different regions.

Victoria Paniagua is Assistant Professor at the London School of Economics. Her research lies at the intersection of international and comparative historical political economy and centres on development, redistribution, and state-building in Latin America. She is currently working on a book based on her dissertation, which was awarded APSA's Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in political economy. Prior to joining the LSE, she received her PhD in Political Science from Duke University and was a Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute and a Visiting Fellow at the University of Notre Dame's Kellogg Institute for International Studies.

Joan Ricart-Huguet is an Assistant Professor at Loyola University Maryland. Previously, he was a Postdoctoral Associate and Lecturer at the Program on Ethics, Politics, & Economics at Yale University. He received his Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University. His interests are wide-ranging and interdisciplinary. They include political elites, colonial investments and legacies, and decentralization, with a regional focus on Africa and more recently on Latin America. His work has been published at the *British Journal of Political Science*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Journal of Politics*, and *World Politics*, among others.

12. The Political Consequences of the Jesuit Expulsion from the Spanish Empire in 1767
– Emily Sellars (Yale) and Francisco Garfias (UC San Diego)

We examine the long- and short-term consequences of the expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish Empire. Though Charles III's decision to expel the Jesuits was motivated primarily by unrelated concerns, the reform had major and long-reaching repercussions on colonial institutions in the Americas. Using detailed subnational data, we explore the unanticipated consequences of this move for colonial governance.

Emily A. Sellars is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University. Her research interests are at the intersection of political economy, development economics, and economic history. Her work has been published in leading journals in political science and economics. She serves on the editorial board of the *Journal of Historical Political Economy and Broadstreet*. Her work has received several honors and awards, including APSA's Mancur Olson Award for the best dissertation in political economy in the previous two years. Sellars received her Ph.D. in Political Science and Agricultural and Applied Economics from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Francisco Garfias is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego's School of Global Policy and Strategy. He studies the political economy of development, with a focus on how states build capacity, establish institutions, and navigate civil conflict in developing countries. His work is published in leading political science journals such as the *American Political Science Review*, the *American Journal of Political Science*, and the *Journal of Politics*. His research has received several recognitions, including APSA's Michael Wallerstein Award. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science and M.A. in Economics from Stanford University.

13. The Long-Run Effects of Colonial Boundary Construction in Africa
– Martha Wilfahrt (UC Berkeley)

Precolonial states posed specific challenges to the establishment of colonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa. Using an original dataset of the spatial location of Africa's precolonial polities, this paper examines under what conditions the colonial state constructed political space around preexisting political units and when they attempted to limit their power by splitting them. I then turn to when these short-term efforts at establishing colonial hegemony generated path-dependencies in subnational unit delimitation. Understanding how the state integrated preexisting political hierarchies holds important implications for candidate mechanisms about historical legacies in the region. If, for example, we think that chiefs were better positioned to bargain with the colonial and/or post-colonial state when they originated in a precolonial state, this effect should logically be heightened when the polity was translated into a coherent geographic entity while it should be diminished when the polity was split. The paper's final empirical section evaluates the extent to which the matching between colonial and pre-colonial boundaries correlates with contemporary development outcomes.

Martha Wilfahrt is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where she studies African politics with a focus on historical legacies, redistributive politics, and state-society relations. Her first book, *Precolonial Legacies in Postcolonial Politics*, was published in 2021 (Cambridge). Other work has appeared or is forthcoming in *African Affairs*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *the Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, *World Development* and *World Politics*.

Timeline

We will conduct extensive internal review of the papers in this Special Issue via workshops in Europe and the US, with detailed, intensive scrutiny, prior to submitting articles to *World Development* for approval.

In the table below, 'Expected completion date' lists when colleagues will have good drafts of their articles ready for these workshops. While most colleagues have rough drafts in preparation now and have committed to submit by autumn 2023, their own levels of confidence in these dates vary. A minority of colleagues require more time; additionally, some have family obligations that make shorter travel across fewer time zones preferable. To accommodate everyone, we will divide the group in two and hold a workshop in late November 2023 in Florence (European University Institute; I will be a sabbatical visitor), followed by a second workshop in late April 2024 in Santa Fe, NM (Santa Fe Institute; ditto).

Each workshop will consist of a series of 1-paper sessions in usual style: presentations, named discussants for each paper, and detailed peer review in the form of written comments from discussants plus floor discussion. The guest editor will provide a separate set of comments for each paper. Authors will revise their articles in the months following each workshop. The point is constructive, rigorous review that helps colleagues perfect their research. At that point, articles will be ready for the journal's review.

The timeline below lists a 'Final submission date' for all papers to *World Development* of 1 September 2024. We are confident that they can all be ready by then. But our process implies that roughly half the papers could be submitted earlier, and we are happy to do so if the journal prefers.

Title	Author(s)	Expected completion date	Arm's-length peer reviewers	8 Keywords	Final submission date
1 Introduction: The theory of instrumental incoherence and its application across regions and types of institutional reform	Jean-Paul Faguet (LSE)	30 May 2024	Waltraud Schelke (European U. Institute) Liesbet Hooghe (UNC, Chapel Hill) Michaël Tatham (U. of Bergen) Sara Niedzwiecki (UC Santa Cruz) Nicholas Charron (U. of Gothenburg)	Institutions, Reform, Governance, Institutional theory, Political incentives, Development studies, Political economy, Comparative politics	1 Sept 2024
2 The Unanticipated Consequences of Electoral Reform: Evidence from Chile	Michael Albertus (U. of Chicago), Victor Menaldo (U. of Washington), Jorge Rojas-Vallejos (U. Andrés Bello)	1 April 2024	James Loxton (U. of Sydney) Steve Levitsky (Harvard) Jon Londregan (Princeton) Vicky Murillo (Columbia) Vincent Mauro (Cornell)	Electoral reform, Campaign finance reform, Polarization, Populism, Legislative politics, Comparative politics, Democratic theory, Chile	1 Sept 2024
3 When Inclusive Reforms End up Reinforcing Regressive Social Institutions: The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Quotas For Women in Rural India	Rachel Brulé (Boston U.), Alyssa Heinze (UC Berkeley) and Simon Chauchard (U. Carlos III Madrid)	1 Nov 2023	Diana Z. O'Brien (Washington U. in St. Louis) Mirya Holman (Tulane) Tariq Thachil (U. of Pennsylvania) Anjali Thomas (Georgia Inst. of Technology) Dawn Teele (Johns Hopkins)	Electoral quotas, Inclusive politics, Local government, Gender, Political marginalization, Decentralization, Institutions, India	1 Sept 2024
4 Virtuous outcomes of instrumental intentions? The case of Uruguay's 1996 Constitutional reform	Felipe Carozzi (LSE) and Germán Bidegain (U. de la República)	1 Nov 2023	Fernando Rosenblatt (U. Diego Portales, Chile) Adrián Albala (U. de Brasilia) Rafael Piñeiro (U. Católica, Uruguay)	Constitutional reform, Electoral reform, Institutions, First-past-the-post, Coalition politics, Political economy, Comparative politics, Uruguay	1 Sept 2024
5 Instrumental incoherence and the emergence of Morena out of Mexico's failed decentralization reform	Alberto Diaz-Cayeros (Stanford)	1 Nov 2023	Guillermo Trejo (Notre Dame) Sandra Ley (CIDE, Mexico) Mariano Sanchez Talanquer (Colegio de Mexico) Alicia Holland (Harvard) Laura Flamand (Colegio de Mexico)	Decentralization, Municipal government, Public goods, Fiscal federalism, Criminal Violence, Institutions, Reform, Mexico	1 Sept 2024
6 The introduction of direct gubernatorial elections in 4 unitary countries (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile) over the past 30 years	Kent Eaton (UC Santa Cruz)	1 Nov 2023	Julieta Suárez-Cao (Catholic U. of Chile) Hillel Soifer (Temple U.) Jennifer Pribble (U. of Richmond) Eduardo Moncada (Columbia) Stephanie McNulty (Franklin and Marshall College)	Unitary state, Regional elections, Decentralization, Fiscal federalism, Subnational government, Institutions, Reform, Latin America	1 Sept 2024

Title	Author(s)	Expected completion date	Arm's-length peer reviewers	8 Keywords	Final submission date
7 The Unintended Revolution: Brexit and Instrumental Incoherence	Jonathan Hopkin (LSE)	1 April 2024	Colin Hay (Science Po) Anand Menon (King's College London) Peter Hall (Harvard) Matthias Matthijs (Johns Hopkins)	Brexit, Referendum, Political parties, British constitution, Political representation, Institutions, European Union, United Kingdom	1 Sept 2024
8 Official Vigilantism: Criminal justice reform in Venezuela	Dorothy Kronick (UC Berkeley) and Rebecca Hanson (U. of Florida)	1 Nov 2023	David Skarbek (Brown) Graeme Blair (UCLA) Alisha Holland (Harvard) Daniel Brinks (UT Austin) Jane Esberg (U. of Pennsylvania)	Criminal justice, Police violence, Institutions, Reform, Human rights, Survey experiment, Vigilantism, Venezuela	1 Sept 2024
9 Switching to English in Rwanda's Educational Curriculum: Estimating the Return on Investment	David Laitin (Stanford), Rajesh Ramachandran (Monash U. Malaysia) and Eli Scott (Stanford)	1 April 2024	Amy Liu (UT Austin) [amy.liu@austin.utexas.edu] Shlomo Weber (Southern Methodist U.) [sweber@mail.smu.edu] James Habyarimana (Georgetown U.) [jph35@georgetown.edu]	Language policy, Human capital, Human development, Comparative politics, French, English, Rwanda, Burundi	1 Sept 2024
10 From inquisitorial to adversarial criminal justice: Police brutality and due process in Mexico	Beatriz Magaloni (Stanford)	1 Nov 2023	Omar Garcia Ponce (George Washington U.) Rafael J. Ch Duran (Princeton) Guillermo Trejo (Notre Dame) Thad Dunning (UC Berkeley)	Police brutality, Criminal justice, Due process, Reform, Inquisitorial regime, Adversarial regime, Multi-method design, Mexico	1 Sept 2024
11 Representation in the Legislature and the Executive as Substitutes? Evidence from Political Elites in Argentina	Victoria Paniagua (LSE) and Joan Ricart-Huguet (Loyola U.)	1 Nov 2023	Ernesto Calvo (U. of Maryland) Rikhil Bhavnani (U. of Wisconsin-Madison) Tulia Falleti (U. of Pennsylvania) Luis Schiumerini (Notre Dame) Gustavo Flores-Macias (Cornell)	Representation, Malapportionment, Legislature, Executive, Federalism, Elite politics, Core-periphery, Argentina	1 Sept 2024
12 The Political Consequences of the Jesuit Expulsion from the Spanish Empire in 1767	Emily Sellars (Yale) and Francisco Garfias (UC San Diego)	1 Nov 2023	Chris Carter (U. of Virginia) Edgar Franco Vivanco (U. of Michigan) Luz Marina Arias (CIDE, Mexico) Luis Martinez (U. of Chicago)	Institutions, Reform, Governance, Colonialism, Jesuits, Subnational analysis, Spanish Empire, Latin America	1 Sept 2024
13 The Long-Run Effects of Colonial Boundary Construction in Africa	Martha Wilfahrt (UC Berkeley)	1 April 2024	Noah Nathan (MIT) Carl Mueller-Crepon (LSE) Lindsey Pruett (Cornell)	Pre-colonial institutions, Colonial boundaries, Subnational boundaries, Federalism, Decentralization, Comparative politics, Long-run development, Sub-Saharan Africa	1 Sept 2024