

# Approaching complex networks with power system models and data

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IOWA STATE  
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# Some infrastructures for study:

electric grid

electric grid PLUS

- communications
- controls
- human operators
- effects of engineering, society

electric grid COUPLED with

- communications
- water
- gas

There is no general model for the grid;  
there are specific models useful for specific  
phenomena at different time scales,  
such as

Lightning

Faults and protection

Synchronization/Transient stability

Oscillations

Voltage collapse (slow type)


Operational planning

Planning and upgrades

National energy flows

# Types of models

(all are needed for tough problems)




Arrows show validations

The physical network of the grid is intimately involved in the grid behavior, but does not by itself capture the network dynamics or interactions.


The complex network of interest must be the physical network plus other attributes or an entirely different network of interactions.

# Hassayampa-N. Gila line trip

power flows  
**BEFORE**



power flows  
**AFTER**



# Examples of phenomena common to power systems and complex networks

(de)synchronization – transient stability


phase transitions in cascading  
SOC/power laws

other phenomena?

Complex network theory can and does inspire work in power systems, but the application is not direct and the work should be done with validated models of power systems




# Example 1: Cascading line outages



# How do outages propagate in blackouts?


- many mechanisms, from physics to human
- both local and global effects (many mechanisms do not move along the graph topology e.g. overloads propagate along cutsets)

# Example 1: Cascading line outages



Solve problem of estimating probability of rare events by estimating parameter of high-level model

# Example 2: SOC in series of blackouts




# OPA model Summary

## (closed loop, slow evolution)


- underlying slow load growth + noisy load variations
- engineering responses to blackouts: upgrade lines involved in blackouts; upgrade generation:  
Respond to failures by fixing and improving the weakest parts!
- conventionally look at short-term reliability of a fixed network; here we are looking at long-term reliability accounting for evolution under complex system dynamics.

# Modeling with complex systems feedback upgrading system




Analogy with control theory suggests that outcome largely depends on feedback and depends much less on cascading model

Distribution of blackout size: match between OPA on 1553 node model of WECC and NERC data



# Example 3: inter-area oscillations





Power grids are engineered and evolving networks,  
*not* general networks

– engineers coordinate the parameters and operating rules to provide reliable function at minimum cost


- 1) These remarks obvious in biological systems!
- 2) Use realistic power system parameters, OR
- 3) Model the engineering feedback. Example:  
complex systems feedback of upgrading parts that outage in blackouts can self-organize system towards criticality and explain power laws in observed blackout size distributions

# QUESTIONS?

Papers available from

<http://iandobson.ece.iastate.edu>

# Sequence of outages in Western blackout, July 2 1996



from NERC 1996 blackout report

# Preliminary data on observed outage spreading

