

# Persistent Institutions

Samuel Bowles\* and Suresh Naidu<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Economic institutions often persist over centuries, while transitions among institutions are sometimes abrupt. Many institutional transitions are implemented as the deliberate outcome of bargaining among a small number of elite groups; but some are more decentralized, with changes in practices occurring informally among a large number of private actors prior to being confirmed by changes in formal governance structures. Examples of the latter include the recognition of trade unions in many countries, changes in conventional crop shares, shifts in inheritance practices, and changes in economic relationships between men and women. To capture these informal and decentralized aspects of institutional change, we study the emergence, persistence, and demise of institutions governing the size of the joint surplus and its distribution between two classes. We identify conditions under which efficient and/or egalitarian contractual conventions are likely to emerge and persist. Transitions between contractual conventions occur when sufficiently many individuals deviate from (rather than conform to) the status quo convention. We then make the relative sizes of the two classes endogenous, showing that higher barriers to interclass upward mobility make unequal contracts more persistent, and imply higher levels of societal class inequality. Thus, when upward mobility is restricted, unequal contracts may persist over long periods even if they are very inefficient (yield a small joint surplus). We also let the rate of deviation from the status quo convention vary with the degree of economic polarization and group network structure. Finally, we introduce the state as an actor mediating class conflict, and identify the conditions under which it will adopt redistributive strategies.

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\*Corresponding author: Samuel Bowles, bowles@santafe.edu. Santa Fe Institute and the University of Siena. <sup>1</sup>snaidu@econ.berkeley.edu, Santa Fe Institute and UC Berkeley. Sung Ha Hwang made many improvements to the text. We also thank Tone Ognedal and Elisabeth Wood for comments and the Behavioral Sciences Program of the Santa Fe Institute, the Russell Sage Foundation, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, for support of this project.

# 1 Introduction

Economic institutions such as labor relations, land tenure, and inheritance systems often persist over centuries, while transitions among these institutions are sometimes abrupt. Differences in geography and in colonial policies, for example, sometimes result in persistent institutional differences with long term economic and social effects (Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, Acemoglu et al. 2001). Land tenure systems and associated crop shares often display enduring common features that are robust to changes in technology and differences in agricultural fundamentals (Bardhan 1984, Young and Burke 2001).

While many institutional transitions are implemented as the deliberate outcome of bargaining among a small number of elite groups, some are more decentralized, with changes in practices occurring informally among a large number of private actors that are later confirmed by changes in formal governance structures. In many countries and periods this decentralized and informal aspect of institutional transition is evident in, for example, the recognition of trade unions, changes in conventional crop shares, shifts in inheritance practices, changes in economic relationships between men and women.

Recent contributions to the political economy and institutions literature have modeled institutional persistence and change as the outcome of bargaining between representative agents of a small number of economic groups. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), for example, consider a model in which formal institutions change between democracy and non-democracy even while at the informal economic institutions persist. Our approach differs from theirs in two ways. Firstly we focus on how the informal economic institutions change. Secondly we model the process by which these institutions change as decentralized bargaining in an evolutionary framework (Young, 1988, Binmore, Samuelson, Young, 2003).

We share with Acemoglu and Robinson a perspective that emphasizes intentionality and social conflict as key ingredients in a theory of institutional persistence and change. This differs from the evolutionary game theory approach to institutional innovation and change in which the observed institutions are the outcome of a process of random experimentation and adaptation.

Like both of these approaches and some others (e.g., Galor 2005, Acemoglu 2005), our model identifies conditions under which the Political Coase Theorem (Acemoglu 2003) fails, and inefficient economic institutions persist in the long run. But in contrast to the complementary models developed by Acemoglu and Robinson(2001), commitment problems play no role in explaining inefficient institutions in our approach. Rather, an inefficient institution may persist due to coordination failures, as in Axtell, Epstein and Young 2003. But in contrast to Young (1998), in our model an inefficient institution may endure even when it implements highly unequal outcomes as long as intergenerational mobility into the class that benefits from the unequal institution is sufficiently restricted. Also, in contrast to the “Big-Push” literature (e.g. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989), which also looks at coordination failures, we model endo-

geneous (stochastic) transitions between institutional steady-states, and then how an unequal distribution of income can render the surplus-maximizing equilibrium unstable.

By synthesizing the political economy and evolutionary approaches we hope to match several stylized facts about institutional transitions. These include the fact that economic institutions sometimes change before political institutions (the demise of feudalism in early modern Western Europe, e.g. Brenner 1976), the often observed pattern of local homogeneity and global heterogeneity of economic institutions (crop shares, e.g. Bardhan 1984), the long term persistence of institutions that are both inefficient and unequal (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000), punctuated institutional equilibria (the end of Communist rule, e.g. Lohmann 1994), and the fragility of highly unequal economic institutions in modern industrial economies compared to their robust persistence in premodern times (Trigger 2003, Hobsbawm 1964).

For concreteness, we study the emergence and persistence of contracts that govern the size of the joint surplus and its distribution between two classes, and we identify conditions under which efficient and/or egalitarian contracts are likely to emerge and to persist. We represent these institutions as conventions between such discrete classes of economic actors as employers and workers, landlords and share croppers, or slave owners and slaves. As these examples suggest, relationships between classes are not exhaustively described by the distribution of income (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986), but includes also political relationships (Robinson and Conning 2006).

Are there common structural properties that account for the emergence and persistence of evolutionarily successful contracts? To answer this question we study transitions between contracts that result when a sufficiently large number of individuals play idiosyncratically rather than adopting a best response (Young (1993a), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993)). However, as in Naidu and Bowles (2006) and Bowles (2004), and in contrast to these models, we represent idiosyncratic play as intentional challenges to the status quo convention rather than behavioral errors.

Transitions occur when the number of individuals in one class who reject the terms given by the status quo contractual arrangement is sufficient to induce best-responding individuals in the other class to deviate from the status quo contract as well. In this approach, existing institutions persist, and new institutions emerge in the presence of idiosyncratic play if they have large basins of attraction in an appropriate dynamic. By specifying a historically plausible dynamic we can explore the effects on institutional persistence of such characteristics the size and distribution of the joint surplus associated with each set of contracts.

In the next section we examine a historical case that illustrates the main aspects of the institutional dynamic we wish to model. Then we introduce a contract game and study the contractual equilibrium selection process when idiosyncratic play is intentional in the sense that deviations from best responses are limited to those which would benefit the deviant individual, were sufficiently many others to do the same. We show that if class sizes and rates of idiosyncratic play are equal, this dynamic reproduces a

result analogous to Young's contract theorem (Young 1998), namely that the conventions selected by this dynamic are both efficient and egalitarian. We then let the sizes of the two classes and their rates of idiosyncratic play differ. In contrast to unintentional idiosyncratic play models, our dynamic selects contracts that favor the less numerous class and the class with the higher rate of idiosyncratic play. If the poorer class is the more numerous (as is typically the case) the contractual equilibria selected need not risk dominant, and may be both unequal and inefficient.

We then study the evolution of class sizes resulting from inter-generational mobility across class boundaries. We model barriers to upward mobility (e.g. credit constraints) of the type studied by Galor and Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Mookerjee and Ray (2006), Benabou (1998), and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) and show that for a given cost of mobility there exists a unique equilibrium distribution of class membership and distribution of the joint surplus between the two classes. By limiting the size of the well off class, barriers to class mobility support higher levels of inequality in equilibrium. This is true for two reasons: the selected contract is more unequal, and the endogenously determined class sizes allow the richer class to engage in contracts with a larger number of the poor. We then explicitly model the idiosyncratic play process by taking account of the amount of information available to members of each class, distinguishing in this way between modern and pre-modern class structures. We then introduce governmental policies of redistribution, and also let the rate of idiosyncratic play vary with the degree of economic polarization at each state. We suggest that the less segmented intra-class information structure and heightened polarization of incomes in early capitalism may have provided conditions favorable to working class challenges to the status quo, and partly as a result, to the emergence of a redistributive state. The penultimate section suggests extensions to address the influence of technical change, variations in inheritance systems, endogenous barriers to upward mobility, collective action, demographic structure, governmental capacities and the tension between bargaining power and political power.

## 2 Decentralized Institutional Transitions

We combine the decentralized individual-based dynamic of evolutionary game theory with the group distributional conflict approach common to political economy because we think that in many historically important cases both aspects were important. Among these cases is the transitions to democratic rule in South Africa.

The labor market aspects of South African apartheid were a convention regulating the patterns of racial inequality which had existed throughout most of South Africa's recorded history and had been formalized in the early 20th century and especially in the aftermath of World War II. For white business owners, the convention might be expressed: Offer only low wages for menial work to blacks. For black workers the convention was: Offer one's labor at low wages, do not demand access to skilled employment. These actions represented mutual best responses: As long as (almost) all white employers adhered to their side of the convention, the black workers' best re-

sponse was to adhere to their aspect of the convention, and conversely.

The power of apartheid labor market conventions is suggested by the fact that real wages of black gold miners did not rise between 1910 and 1970, despite periodic labor shortages on the mines and a many-fold increase in productivity (Wilson (1972)). But a series of strikes beginning in the early 1970s and burgeoning after the mid-1980s with the organization of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) signaled a rejection of apartheid by increasing numbers of black workers. The refusal of Soweto students to attend classes taught in Afrikaans and the ensuing 1976 uprising returned civil disobedience to levels not experienced since the anti-pass law demonstrations a decade and a half earlier, including the one at Sharpeville at which 69 protesters had been killed by police. The acceleration of urban protests loosely coordinated by the United Democratic Front (UDF), contributed to what came to be termed the “un-governability” of the country and its businesses. Figure 1 depicts these trends.

Many business leaders concluded that adherence to the old convention was no longer a best response, leading them to alter their labor relations, raising real wages and promoting black workers. An executive of the Anglo American Corporation, South Africa’s largest, commented: “. . .in the business community we were extremely concerned about the long-run ability to do business. . .” (Wood (2000):171) Starting in the mid 1980s, the Corporation developed new policies for ‘managing political uncertainty’ and to address worker grievances, including granting workers a half day off to celebrate the Soweto uprising. In September 1985, Anglo American’s Gavin Relly led several business leaders on a clandestine “trek” to Lusaka to seek common ground with African National Congress leaders in exile. In 1986 the Federated Chamber of Industries issued a business charter with this explanation: “the business community has accepted that far reaching political reforms have to [be] introduced to normalize the environment in which they do business.” FCI (1990). An official of the Chamber of Mines described the situation in 1987

The political situation in the country was really dismal and we knew that we were going to have one mother of a wage negotiation. And that the issue wasn’t what level of increases we negotiated; the issue was do we survive or not? Will there, after this negotiation, still be such a thing as managerial prerogative. Who controls the mines, really? That was what it would boil down to. (Wood (2000): 169)

Reflecting on the 1987 strike in the gold mines, a business executive said:

. . .the most important thing that both sides learned is that you must not underestimate the bargaining power of your opponent and his ability to hurt you. . . On our side, gone was the thought that if they strike it will be for only four days.

In addition to conceding many of their black employees’ workplace demands, business-led pressure for political reforms mounted, joined by reform advocates from the governments intelligence services, churches and others. Late in 1989, four years after the state

of emergency had been declared in response to the strike wave and urban unrest, F. W. de Klerk replaced the intransigent P. W. Botha as State President. In 1990 he lifted the ban on the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and other anti-apartheid organizations, and released Nelson Mandela from prison. Mandela was elected president in South Africa's first democratic election in 1994.

Note the following about this process. First, the concession of best-responding businesses to the idiosyncratically-playing black workers occurred well before and constituted one of the causes of the political transition. The redistribution of economic resources thus predated and contributed to the redistribution of political resources. Second, even at the peak of the 1980s strike wave, the number of black workers rejecting the status quo transaction never exceeded 11 per cent of the non-agricultural labor force. Third, while trade unions, 'civics' (community organizations), and other groups were involved in the rent strikes, student stay aways, and strikes against employers, the rejection of apartheid was highly decentralized and only loosely coordinated prior to the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. We now model an abstract transition process with these general features.




Figure 1: Political and economic disturbances in South Africa, 1960-1994 (Sources: Strikers: Statistics South Africa; Detentions: Institute of Race Relations, Yearbooks; Political Instability: Fedderke, De Kadt, and Luiz (2001))

### 3 Institutional Equilibrium Selection

Contracts differ both in the kinds of incentives that they provide and the distributional shares between the two classes that they implement. For concreteness suppose the B's are land owners while A's are those who farm the land. Contract 1 is a sharecropping contract and contract 0 is a fixed rental contract. The share is that which maximizes the landowner's profits (subject to the farmers incentive compatibility constraint for the supply of labor), while the rent is determined by the exogenously given bargaining power of the two parties. Under both contracts, hours of labor,  $L$ , produce output,  $q$ , according to  $q = f(L)$ , where  $f$  is a concave, increasing production function satisfying the Inada conditions. The farmer's (A's) utility varies with income,  $y$  and hours worked:  $U(y, L) = y - U(L)$ . The landowner's (B's) opportunity cost of holding the land is  $k$ . The farmer's utility-maximizing labor supply under either contract is  $L(s)$ ,  $L' > 0$  where  $s$  is the share of the residual output retained by the farmer and is equal to 1 in the fixed rental contract and  $s \in (0, 1)$  in the share contract. Under the rental contract the farmer (as residual claimant) works  $L(1)$  hours, so total output is  $f(L(1))$ . Subtracting from this the disutility of the farmer's labor  $U(L(1))$  and the opportunity cost of the land, the joint surplus is  $f(L(1)) - U(L(1)) - k$

Under the share contract the owner's profits of  $(1 - s)f(L(s))$  are maximized at a share  $s^* < 1$ , under which terms the farmer works  $L(s^*)$  hours, yielding a total output of  $L(s^*)$  and a joint surplus of  $f(L(s^*)) - U(L(s^*)) - k$ .

Other contracts could be considered. The B's might be feudal lords, for example, and the farmers might be obliged to provide a given number of days of labor on the lord's land; or the farmers might be paid wages to work under the supervision of the owners. Our model investigates the conditions under which one contract or another might be sustained for long periods as the prevailing convention among a population.

Suppose we have a large population of agents of size  $N$ , with  $\gamma$  the fraction of population that are of class A, ignoring integer problems. Each period, agents from class A are randomly matched with agents from class B and play the following contract game, with A as the row player illustrated in table 1. We consider A the non-elite agents, or poor, and B the elite, or wealthy agents. Each side proposes a contract (termed 0 or 1) governing the distribution of the surplus (e.g. union recognition, crop-shares, or land tenure norms). If they fail to coordinate on a contract, they both get 0, reflecting the fact that agents are bargaining over a discrete institution, agreement on which is necessary for the production of a surplus, rather than simply over a divisible surplus.

Returning to our example contract above, define  $k^*$  such that  $(1 - s^*)f(L(s^*)) - k^* = s^*f(L(s^*)) - U(L(s^*))$ , so that the share contract equally divides the surplus. As expected, the joint surplus under the rental contract is larger, reflecting the superior incentives of the rental contract. To ensure that both contracts are Pareto optima, we assume the bargaining power of the landlords in the 0 contract to be such that the rent,  $R$  is fixed at  $R^* > f(L(1)) - s^*f(L(s^*)) - U(L(1)) + U(L(s^*))$ , so that farmers are worse off in the rental contract.

We can also define  $\Delta = (1 - s^*)f(L(s^*)) - k^*$ , and divide all the payoffs by  $\Delta$ . Now define  $\rho_s = 2$  as the joint surplus produced under sharecropping, and  $\sigma_s = .5$  as the share that the tenant receives. Also define  $\rho = \frac{f(L(1)) - U(L(1)) - k^*}{\Delta} > 2$  as the joint surplus produced under the rental contract with  $\sigma = \frac{U^*}{\rho} < .5$  being the share received by the tenant. This gives the normalized payoffs in the contract game below.

	0	1
0	$\sigma\rho, (1 - \sigma)\rho$	0,0
1	0,0	1,1

Table 1: Payoffs in the Contract Game

The dynamic governing contractual offers is a familiar myopic best-response dynamic with inertia. Each period, all players are matched to play the contract game. Each time they are matched, agents play the strategy they played last with probability  $\nu$  or revise their strategy with probability  $1 - \nu$ .

We can represent this dynamic by a stochastic dynamical system, where the states represent the number of each population playing each strategy. The state space is given by  $X = \Delta_R \times \Delta_C$ , where  $\Delta_R = \{n_0, n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{K-1} \mid \sum_i n_i = N\}$  and  $\Delta_C = \{m_0, m_1, m_2, \dots, m_{K-1} \mid \sum_i m_i = M\}$  where  $N$  is the size of the row population and  $M$  is the size of the column population, and each  $n_i$  and  $m_i$  is the number of the row and column population, respectively, that is playing strategy  $i$ . Let  $p \in \Delta_R$  and  $q \in \Delta_C$  be vectors denoting the number of agents playing each strategy in the row and column population, respectively. We will often denote a state as  $\theta = (p, q) \in X$ . This defines a Markov process:  $P^\nu : X \rightarrow X$ , defined by  $P^\nu(\theta' \mid \theta) = \text{Prob}(\theta - (\frac{x_1}{N}p, \frac{x_2}{M}q) + (\frac{x_1}{N}BR_R(q), \frac{x_2}{M}BR_C(p)) = \theta')$  where  $x_1 \sim \text{Bin}(N, \nu)$ ,  $x_2 \sim \text{Bin}(M, \nu)$  where  $\text{Bin}(N, \nu)$  is a binomial distribution with  $N$  draws with probability of success given by  $\nu$ . Note that, for generic contracting games and sufficiently large population sizes, the only recurrent classes of this Markov process are the strict pure Nash equilibria, where both players coordinate on the same contract.

We now add a perturbation to this dynamic. Suppose that when agents revise their strategies, they play a non-best response with probability  $\epsilon^{TR}$  for the row players and probability  $\epsilon^{TC}$  for the column players. If the system is at a contract  $i$ , then the row players will choose from all strategies with index greater than  $i$ , while the column players will choose from among all the strategies less than  $i$ , since row payoffs are increasing in the index. More generally, for row(column) players at a state  $\theta = (p, q)$ ,  $i^R(\theta)(i^C(\theta))$  will be the strategy with the least(greatest) index supported by the distribution of play of the column(row) players, where:

$$i^R(\theta) = \max\{i \mid q_i > 0\}$$

$$i^C(\theta) = \min\{i \mid p_i > 0\}$$

The idiosyncratic play distribution in our case is population- and state-dependent; at state  $p, q$  the non-best-response play distribution is  $U(i^R(\theta), K - 1)$  for the row population, and  $U(0, i^C(\theta))$  for the column population. This gives a Markov process defined by:  $P^{\nu, \epsilon}(\theta'|\theta) = \text{Prob}(\theta - (\frac{x_1}{N}p, \frac{x_2}{M}q) + (\frac{1}{N}(x_1 - \sum_{i=0}^{K-1} y_{1i})BR_R(q), \frac{1}{M}(x_2 - \sum_{i=0}^{K-1} y_{2i})BR_C(p)) + (y_1, y_2) = \theta')$  where  $x_1, x_2$  are binomial draws as above,  $y_1 \sim \mathcal{MN}(K, x_1, U(i^R(\theta), K - 1))$  and  $y_2 \sim \mathcal{MN}(K, x_2, U(0, i^C(\theta)))$ , with  $\mathcal{MN}(N, k, f)$  being the multinomial distribution with  $N$  bins,  $k$  draws, and distribution  $f$  over the bins.

This Markovian dynamic can be represented by a transition matrix given by  $P_{\theta\theta'}^{\nu, \epsilon} = P^{\nu, \epsilon}(\theta'|\theta)$ . The long-run steady state of the dynamic is then given by the unique vector  $\mu(\nu, \epsilon) \in \mathbf{R}^{2K}$  that satisfies  $\sum_i \mu_i(\nu, \epsilon) = 1$  and  $\mu(\nu, \epsilon)P^{\nu, \epsilon} = \mu(\nu, \epsilon)$ . We are interested in the states that have positive weight in the distribution  $\mu^*(\nu) = \lim_{\epsilon \rightarrow 0} \mu(\nu, \epsilon)$ . Following Foster and Young(1990) we call these stochastically stable states.

Assume that  $\sigma\rho < 1 < (1 - \sigma)\rho$ , reflecting the assumption that the poor agents do worse in an unequal arrangement. Notice that this game has two strict Nash equilibria  $(1, 1)$  and  $(0, 0)$ . Agents are myopic, and play a best response to the distribution of play in the previous period. This will define a large state-space. If we suppose that  $\gamma$  is fixed, then we can represent the state-space by  $\alpha, \beta$ , where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  denote the fraction of class A and class B playing 1.

The implied Markov process induced by the best-response dynamic has two recurrent classes, which correspond to the strict Nash equilibria of the contract game. The advantage of the stochastic evolutionary approach is that, by introducing small perturbations occurring for each player with probability  $\epsilon$ , a single recurrent class, and therefore a Nash equilibrium, can be selected. The perturbations correspond to non-best-response behavior, which we term “deviant” or “idiosyncratic”. We have in mind rejections of the terms of the status quo contract by either side, such as lockouts, union decertification campaigns, private enclosures of common lands, strikes, slave revolts, and urban food riots. (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 2001)

Suppose also that the status quo convention is  $(0,0)$  namely the convention that favors the better off Bs. If sufficiently many As demand contract 1 rather than the status quo contract 0, best responding Bs will switch to offering contract 1. The minimum number of As deviating from the status quo to induce a switch from contract 0 to contract 1,  $R_{01}$ , is termed the resistance for a transition from 0 to 1 is given by (1). The corresponding resistance for a B-induced transition from the 1 contract to the 0 contract is given by (2). Without loss of generality, we normalize all the resistances by  $N$ , so that they are approximated by:

$$R_{01} = \gamma \frac{(1 - \sigma)\rho}{1 + (1 - \sigma)\rho} \quad (1)$$

$$R_{10} = (1 - \gamma) \frac{1}{1 + \sigma\rho} \quad (2)$$

If the rates of idiosyncratic play do not differ between the classes, the population will spend most of the time at the convention whose displacement requires more deviations from the status quo. This is the stochastically stable state, given by  $i$  such that  $R_{ij} > R_{ji}$ . In this case the expected waiting time before a transition out of  $i$  to  $j$  will exceed that of the reverse transition, so that the population will spend more than half of the time near the convention given by  $i$ .

These resistances differ from those in the standard perturbed Markov process models in which the resistances that drive transitions are identified by letting  $\epsilon$  go to zero so that transitions are induced by the idiosyncratic play of that group for which the least number are required to induce the best responders in the other group to switch strategies (Kandori, Mailath, and Rob 1993, Young 1993, Binmore, Samuelson and Young 2003). By contrast the above resistances the least number of idiosyncratic plays required to induce a transition should it occur. In the contract game, it is always the case that fewer errors are required by members of the group that stands to lose from the transition. Thus the resistances that drive the two processes are always different: resistances in the standard perturbed Markov process model are always less than one half, while ours are greater than one half.

Thus the long run behavior of the system when  $\epsilon$  is non-vanishing can be summarized by  $\tau_0$ , the expected fraction of time that contract 0 will be the most common contract. To determine  $\tau_0$  we calculate the expected waiting time (number of periods) before non best response play by the As induces a transition from contract 0 to contract 1. This is the inverse of the probability,  $\mu_0$ , that in any period a transition from out of contract 0 will be induced. To determine this probability we count the subsets of As sufficiently numerous to induce a transition, then determine the probability (given  $\epsilon$ ) that each subset will be drawn; then sum these probabilities to get the probability that any transition-inducing event occurs,  $\mu_0$ :

$$\mu_0 = \sum_{j \geq R_{01}N}^{\gamma N} \binom{\gamma N}{j} \epsilon^j (1 - \epsilon)^{\gamma N - j} \quad (3)$$

An analogous calculation gives us the probability of a transition from 1:

$$\mu_1 = \sum_{j \geq R_{10}N}^{(1-\gamma)N} \binom{(1-\gamma)N}{j} \epsilon^j (1 - \epsilon)^{\gamma N - j} \quad (4)$$

The long-term behavior of the system is summarized by the approximate times spent in each state (ignoring the insignificant periods of time that the population will be at neither recurrent class):

$$\tau_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1}} \quad (5)$$

$$\tau_1 = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\mu_1}{\mu_0}} \quad (6)$$

In the two contract case we say that contract  $j$  is selected if  $\tau_j > \frac{1}{2}$  and that parameter changes favor contract  $j$  if they increase  $\tau_j$ . We restrict ourselves to the two-contract case for tractability as well as ease of exposition; some of our results extend to many contracts, presented in Naidu and Bowles (2006).

## 4 Equality, Efficiency, and Persistence

We can now investigate the influence of the level of equality and efficiency of a contract on the persistence of the associated convention. Setting  $R_{01} = R_{10}$  from (1) and (2) gives the characteristics of unequal contracts such that the population would spend half of the time at the unequal and half at the egalitarian contract, that is  $\tau_0 = \tau_1 = \frac{1}{2}$ .

$$\gamma \frac{(1-\sigma)\rho}{1+(1-\sigma)\rho} = (1-\gamma) \frac{1}{1+\sigma\rho} \iff \frac{1-\gamma}{\gamma} = \frac{(1-\sigma)\rho + \rho^2(1-\sigma)\sigma}{1+(1-\sigma)\rho} \quad (7)$$

It is simple to check that if  $\gamma = 1/2$ , the stochastically stable equilibrium is risk-dominant. In the 2x2 contract game, this will be the contract that maximizes the product of the payoffs of the two classes, namely  $\rho^2(1-\sigma)\sigma$  for convention 0 and 1 for convention 1. Thus, if  $\rho^2(1-\sigma)\sigma > 1$  then  $R_{01} > R_{10}$ , and 0 will be selected. The reverse inequality implies that 1 is selected.

**Proposition 4.1.** *For the contract set above and the dynamic process with resistances  $R_{01}$  and  $R_{10}$ , and  $\gamma > \frac{1}{2}$ , we have*

1: *If  $\rho > 2$ , then there exists a  $\sigma^* < \frac{1}{2}$  such that for  $\frac{1}{2} > \sigma > \sigma^*$ , contract 0 is selected, and if  $0 < \sigma < \sigma^*$ , contract 1 is selected.*

2:  $\frac{d\sigma^*}{d\rho} < 0$

3: *If  $\rho < 2$  then contract 1 is selected.*

4:  $\frac{d\sigma^*}{d\gamma} < 0$


*Proof.* 1 follows from equation (1) and (2), since  $\sigma = 0$  ensures that  $R_{01} < R_{10}$  and  $\sigma = \frac{1}{2}$  ensures that  $R_{01} > R_{10}$ .

2 and 4 follow from totally differentiating equation (3), setting the result equal to 0, and solving for  $\frac{d\sigma}{d\rho}$  and  $\frac{d\sigma^*}{d\gamma}$ .

3 follows from noting that  $\rho < 2$  implies  $R_{01} < R_{10}$ . □

When the classes are of equal size, and  $\sigma$  is strictly less than one half, the unequal convention (0,0) will be selected only if the joint surplus that it generates is correspondingly greater than the egalitarian contract. This expression reproduces the intuition underlying Young's contract theorem.

The reason why the unequal convention is disfavored in this dynamic is transparent from figure 1, which gives the resistances for moving to and from a benchmark contract with payoffs, 1,1, when the other contract has payoffs  $\sigma\rho$  and  $(1 - \sigma)\rho$ . Notice that if the As get nothing in the unequal contract ( $\sigma = 0$ ), even if all of the B's (that is  $1 - \gamma$ ) idiosyncratically offer their preferred contract, it is only a weak best response for the A's to concede, as they would thereby gain nothing. By contrast, idiosyncratic play by fewer than all of the A's, namely,  $\gamma\frac{\rho}{1+\rho}$ , is sufficient to induce a transition in the other direction, that is, out of the  $\sigma = 0$  contract. As can be seen, as the unequal contract becomes more unequal both resistances increase, but  $R_{10}$  rises faster than  $R_{01}$ , so movement from the equal to the unequal convention become relatively more difficult. This is the reason why highly unequal contracts are not stochastically stable.



**Figure 1.** Resistances for a transition to the equal(1) and unequal(0) contract as a function of the degree of inequality in the latter. If the As share in the unequal contract,  $\sigma > \sigma^*$  the unequal convention is selected; for shares less than  $\sigma^*$  the equal contract is selected.

However, if class sizes differ and if the As are more numerous, the evolutionary dynamic need not favor the egalitarian contract. As is clear from (7) and figure 1, for any given level of  $\sigma$  and  $\rho$ , there exists some level of  $\gamma$  such that if the relative size of the A class exceeds this critical level, the unequal contract will be selected. Note that this runs counter to the standard results about equilibrium selection in 2x2 games, where the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected. In this model, even if  $\rho^2\sigma(1 - \sigma) < 1$ , the unequal contract can be selected if  $\gamma$  is sufficiently large.

Thus the equilibrium selection process favors smaller classes. The reason is not the incentive-based logic stressed by the political science literature on collective action inspired by Olson (1965); nor is it related to the fact that excess supply of a factor of production may disadvantage its 'owners' in markets. Rather the advantage of small

size arises, simply because smaller groups are more likely to experience realizations of idiosyncratic play large enough to induce a transition as long as the rate of idiosyncratic play is less than the critical fraction of idiosyncratic players required to induce a transition.

## 5 Intergenerational Mobility

The assumption that class sizes are given may now be relaxed. Suppose that being a member of the B class requires that one's parents have joint income not less than some minimum amount, which, for simplicity, constitutes the next generations inheritance. This impediment to class mobility arises because class membership requires that one undertake a project with a minimum size, as in Legros and Newman (1996), for example owning capital goods sufficient to employ an economically viable team of workers. In this case, inheritance of the asset is required because members of the less well off class are credit constrained. In the absence of credit constraints, the minimum asset requirement could also reflect educational, life style, and other impediments to vertical mobility. Those who inherit less than this amount are members of the A class. In the resulting model, then, the stochastically stable contract and the relative sizes of the two classes will be jointly determined. We will make the simplifying assumption that the population dynamic is rapid relative to the best-response dynamic, so that we only need to analyze population steady-states.

Changes in the sizes of the two classes will occur due to class mobility that occurs when an offspring of a B parent has insufficient wealth to retain its upper class status, or when a child of an A has sufficient wealth to change class membership. How often this occurs will depend on four things: the degree of class assortment in parenting, the inheritance rules in force (primogeniture or equal inheritance, for example), the minimal inheritance required for membership in a given class, and the payoffs of the two parents. We assume equal inheritance to the two offspring of each couple and abstract from marital assortment as it will not affect the resulting equilibria. We assume that when parents belong to the same class, the two offspring retain the parents' class membership, the payoffs of two B's always being sufficient for both offspring to remain B's and the payoffs to two A's never being sufficient to allow their two offspring to become B's.

The mean income of the cross-class couple is given by the mean income of the A parent,  $\alpha\beta + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta)\rho\sigma$ , plus the mean income of the B parent. Thus :


$$y_c(\gamma) := \alpha_t\beta_t + (1 - \alpha_t)(1 - \beta_t)\rho\sigma + (\beta_t\alpha_t + (1 - \beta_t)(1 - \alpha_t)\rho(1 - \sigma))\frac{\gamma_t}{1 - \gamma_t} \quad (8)$$

where the last term is the income of the B parent (who gains a mean payoff of  $\beta_t\alpha_t + (1 - \beta_t)(1 - \alpha_t)\rho(1 - \sigma)$  in each of  $\frac{\gamma}{1 - \gamma}$  interactions with members of the A class.) The amount required for entry to the B-class is  $\bar{\pi}$ , so children of the cross-class couple will become members of the B class if  $y_c - 2\bar{\pi} > 0$ .

The change in  $\gamma$  from one generation to the next is as follows. Letting  $\gamma_{t+1}$  represent the fraction of As in the next generation, it will equal the fraction of As this generation plus the children of cross-class marriages that became As minus the children of cross-class marriages that became Bs. Each cross-class couple produces either 2 B children or 2 A children, subtracting or adding one member of the A class (since one of the parents is of each class). In the absence of class assortment in marriage, the number of cross-class couples is  $\gamma(1 - \gamma)$ . Thus we can write:

$$\gamma_{t+1} = \gamma_t + \gamma_t(1 - \gamma_t)\text{sgn}(2\bar{\pi} - y_c(\gamma_t)) \quad (9)$$

To show that such an equilibrium exists, is unique, and is stable, it is necessary and sufficient that  $\gamma_{t+1}(\frac{1}{2}) > \frac{1}{2}$  and that for some  $\gamma \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ ,  $\gamma_{t+1}(\gamma) < \gamma$ . Recall that the income of the cross-class couple is increasing in  $\gamma$ . For a given  $\sigma$ , the existence and stability condition will obtain if the expected income of the poorest possible cross-class couple (that is when  $\gamma = \frac{1}{2}$ ) is insufficient to allow upward mobility for their offspring, while the expected income of the richest possible cross-class couple ensures upward mobility. The first condition obtains if  $\bar{\pi} > \rho/2$  because with  $\gamma = \frac{1}{2}$ , the cross-class couple has an income of just  $\rho$  in the unequal contract. To see when the second condition obtains, note that the richest possible cross-class couple, in the unequal contract, is that in which  $\gamma = \frac{(N-1)}{N}$  so that the lone B in the population is married to an A, and interacts economically with every A member of the population including the spouse. The income of this couple, summing the income of the B and the A is  $(N - 1)(1 - \sigma)\rho + \sigma\rho$ . Both children of this couple will become Bs, then, if this income exceeds  $2\bar{\pi}$  or  $\bar{\pi} < \frac{(N-1)\rho - \sigma(N-2)}{2}$ .



**Figure 2.** Endogenous determination of class size. For  $\gamma < \gamma^*$  the cross-class couple has insufficient income for their children to become Bs; for  $\gamma > \gamma^*$  both of the cross class couple's children become Bs.

The second condition is most stringent, in the unequal contract, when  $\sigma = 1/2$  and is then equivalent to  $\bar{\pi} < \rho N/4$ . Thus there will exist a stable population distribution between the two classes if the cost of vertical mobility is more than half the average income and less than a quarter of the total income of the society. These two conditions ensure that the equilibrium A-class size  $\gamma^*$  is that which equates  $2\bar{\pi}$  to  $y_c(\gamma)$ , and because  $y_c$  is monotonic in  $\gamma$ , this equilibrium is unique. Thus the equilibrium population fraction for this two contracts  $\gamma^\alpha$  and  $\gamma_1^k$ , in the value of  $\gamma$  that equates  $2\bar{\pi}$  to the income of the cross-class couple for the two contracts:

$$\gamma_0^* = \frac{2\bar{\pi} - \sigma\rho}{(1 - \sigma)\rho + 2\bar{\pi} - \sigma\rho} \quad (10)$$

$$(11)$$

$$\gamma_1^* = 1 - 1/2\bar{\pi} \quad (12)$$

As expected, both are increasing in  $\bar{\pi}$ . This generates a joint discrete dynamic system on the space  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$ , that, without perturbations, has two recurrent classes, given by  $(1, 1, \gamma_1^*)$ , which we will call 1 when there is no ambiguity, and  $(0, 0, \gamma_0^*)$ , which we will similarly call 0. It is straightforward to compute the resistances for the transitions between these two recurrent states. Since the relative populations are different in each equilibrium, and the population that is playing idiosyncratically is different in each equilibrium, we obtain the following resistances:

$$R_{01} = \gamma_0^* \frac{(1 - \sigma)\rho}{1 + (1 - \sigma)\rho} \quad (13)$$

$$R_{10} = (1 - \gamma_1^*) \frac{1}{1 + \sigma\rho} \quad (14)$$

Thus we are able to explore the effects of exogenous changes in  $\bar{\pi}$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $\rho$  on the stochastically stable contract, the equilibrium class sizes, and hence on the income inequality between members of the two classes. Intuitively we would expect that as the barrier to mobility increased (higher  $\bar{\pi}$ ) the poor class would be more numerous in equilibrium and the population would spend a larger fraction of the time at the unequal contract. The result of these two consequences of an increase in  $\bar{\pi}$ , one would expect, would be to increase the income difference between the two classes.

Proposition 3.2 shows that these intuitions are correct.

**Proposition 5.1.** *Given  $\rho, \sigma$ , there exists a value of  $\bar{\pi}^* = \bar{\pi}^*(\sigma, \rho)$  such that, for all  $\bar{\pi} > \bar{\pi}^*$ , we have  $(0, 0, \gamma_0^*)$  as the stochastically stable state.*

*Proof.* Select  $\bar{\pi}^*$  such that  $R_{01} = R_{10}$ , meaning that it is equally easy to leave  $(1, 1, \gamma_1^*)$  as  $(0, 0, \gamma_0^*)$ . It is straightforward algebra to check that as  $\bar{\pi}$  goes from 0 to  $\infty$  (10) goes from  $\frac{1}{1-\frac{1}{\sigma}} < 0$  to 1, and (11) goes from  $-\infty$  to 1. This implies that (12) is less than 0 for low values of  $\bar{\pi}$  and also goes to infinity as  $\bar{\pi}$  gets large, and that (13) goes from infinity to 0. This implies that a unique solution  $\bar{\pi}^*$  exists, such that  $\forall \bar{\pi} > \bar{\pi}^*$  we have  $R_{10} < R_{01}$ , so that 0 is stochastically stable.  $\square$

An implication of proposition 3.2 is that the risk dominant contract will not be selected if the cost of vertical class mobility is sufficiently high.

An increase in  $\rho$  (from 10) lowers  $\gamma_0^*$  as it increases the income of the cross-class couple, thereby facilitating mobility out of the A-class, reducing the equilibrium size of that class and hence favoring them. But the effect on equilibrium selection is ambiguous, as an increase in the productivity of the unequal contract (with no change in the equal contract) will increase the fraction of idiosyncratically playing As necessary to induce the best responding Bs to abandon the unequal contract and at the same time reduce the number of idiosyncratically playing B's required to induce a shift from 1 to 0. However, a proportional increase in the productivity of both contracts, for example, scaling up the payoff matrix in Table 1 by some  $\omega > 1$ , does not affect the fraction of each class whose idiosyncratic play is sufficient to induce a transition. In this case the only effect of an increase in  $\rho$  is, assuming  $\bar{\pi}$  fixed as above, to reduce the equilibrium size of the A-class in both contracts, favoring the As and unambiguously increasing the fraction of time spent at the more equal convention.

## 6 Modern and Pre-Modern Class Structures

Over the course of history, institutions that have implemented unequal outcomes have differed dramatically in ways not captured thus far by our evolutionary contract game. As a result we might expect that contracts with identical values of  $\sigma$  and  $\rho$  would experience quite different dynamics. The distributional consequences of an economic institution are thus necessary but not sufficient to the explanation of its historical trajectory.

This reasoning originates with Marx's distinction between the industrial proletariat, whose agglomerated conditions of work facilitated collective identity and coordinated action, on the one hand, and the pre-capitalist agricultural and urban *lumpenproletariat*, whose dispersed conditions of work did not (Marx (1963)). The difference between the two, according to Marx, was not that the former is exploited more intensively than the latter, but that the labor markets characteristic of modern capitalist economy facilitate the emergence of a culture of solidarity among workers. Marx used the expression "abstract labor" to capture the lack of transaction-specific assets and footloose nature of employees in classical capitalism. By contrast, earlier class systems, according to Ernest Gellner (1983), were characterized by "laterally separated petty

communities of the lay members of society” speaking different dialects or even languages, presided over by a culturally and linguistically homogeneous class. Economic relations in such societies often took the form of patron-client relationships that endured over generations with little mobility of the clients among the patrons (Fafchamps, 1992, Platteau, 1995, Blau, 1964).

The patron client relationship will support a very different dynamic from the relationship of employee to employer in the modern labor market. The reason is that these two institutions affect the information available to agents when they adopt best responses. Suppose that when adopting a best response the members of the two classes do not know the entire distribution of play in the previous period. Thus As and Bs know the play of a fraction of the opposing class given by  $k_A$  and  $k_B$ . Pre-capitalist agrarian institutions, in Gellner’s view, entailed  $k_A < k_B$ , for the upper class communicated readily amongst themselves and therefore had information about the recent play of a large segment of the less well-off class. The geographical, cultural and linguistic isolation of the As, by contrast, militated against information sharing beyond ones local community.

The advantage enjoyed by the B’s is not that a given B-patron may engage the A-clients of other B’s. Rather, by drawing information from a larger sample of A’s, the B’s less noisy signal of the distribution of play reduces the likelihood that their myopic best response will overreact to the chance occurrence of a high level of idiosyncratic play among their particular A-clients.

Assuming for simplicity that  $\gamma_1, \gamma_0$  are given, the resistances  $R_{01}$  and  $R_{10}$  are:

$$R_{10} = k_A(1 - \gamma_1^*) \frac{1}{1 + \sigma\rho} \quad (15)$$

$$R_{01} = k_B\gamma_0^* \frac{(1 - \sigma)\rho}{1 + (1 - \sigma)\rho} \quad (16)$$

The two ‘scope of vision’ parameters in the resistances ( $k_A, k_B$ ) mean that more idiosyncratic players are required to induce a concession by the best responding members of the population that has more information. If  $k_A$  is small, then it only takes a few idiosyncratic plays by Bs to convince the best responding As to concede to the unequal contract. As is evident from (14) and (15) an increase in  $k_A$  is equivalent to a increase in the size of the B population and conversely for an increase in  $k_B$ .

**Proposition 6.1.** *For given  $\gamma_0, \gamma_1, \rho > 2, \sigma < \frac{1}{2}$ , there is a  $\frac{k_A^*}{k_B^*}$ , such that for all  $\frac{k_A}{k_B} < \frac{k_A^*}{k_B^*}$ , the unequal contract is stochastically stable.*

*Proof.* Obvious from comparing the resistances. □

The “institutional efficiency-equality tradeoff” obtains in this extended model, but a highly unequal contract may nonetheless be selected in this dynamic as long as the

information structure associated with it is characterized by a sufficiently low value of  $\frac{k_A}{k_B}$ .

The model thus suggests a possible reason for the trend in many countries over the past 2 centuries towards a reduction in the relative incomes of the well off (Piketty 2005). The geographic, industrial, and occupational mobility characteristic of modern labor markets (coupled with the spread of literacy and greater ease of communication) made workers less responsive to the demands of a small number of local employers, as they both knew about the offers of employers outside their local area. The effect would be to raise  $k_A$  and thus to destabilize highly unequal contracts. The global integration of national economies may reverse this process, recreating something akin to Gellner's view of pre-capitalist class structures with a culturally unified, cosmopolitan B-class, and a nationally and culturally parochial segmented A class (Bowles and Pagano 2006).

## 7 Polarization and Redistributive Politics

We now introduce a forward looking government that may seek to stabilize the status quo contract. One way that this could be done is to punish deviants, who in the current setup forgo one periods payoffs at the status quo contract but are not otherwise penalized. This could readily be modeled here by assigning negative values (rather than zero) to the off diagonal payoffs assigned to those who play idiosyncratically. Instead we focus on government redistribution of income under the unequal contract, as a device to reduce idiosyncratic play.

Economic polarization, as studied by Duclos, Esteban, and Ray (2004), may enhance the frequency of deviant play by the less well off group by providing additional motives and opportunities to challenge the status quo contract (Scott, 1976, Moore, 1978, Wood, 2003). To capture this insight we make the rate of idiosyncratic play state-dependent, and study the response of a far-sighted government seeking on behalf of the myopic Bs to deter a transition to the egalitarian state.

Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that, if one allows  $\epsilon$  to vary arbitrarily as an error function of the state,  $\theta$ , then one can choose a function that selects any recurrent class of the unperturbed process as the stochastically stable state. But what error functions are empirically plausible? We would like to capture the idea that idiosyncratic play will be greater in highly unequal societies. To do this simply, we modify our preceding model, letting a state-dependent idiosyncratic play rate be given by:

$$\epsilon(\theta) = \epsilon \frac{1}{1 + \lambda(\pi^B(\theta) - \pi^A(\theta))} \quad (17)$$

Where  $\lambda > 0$  captures the extent to which inequality increases idiosyncratic play, and  $\pi^B(\theta), \pi^A(\theta)$  are the payoffs to the members of the two classes in state  $\theta$ . Redistributive policies funded by a tax on B income at rate  $t$  will thus reduce the rate of idiosyncratic play in the unequal contract. Sociological conditions favoring rejection of unequal contracts as well as religious or other cultural settings that make economic inequality illegitimate will increase  $\lambda$ . In the equal contract, the B class idiosyncratically

plays at rate  $\epsilon$ , since  $\pi^B(1) = \pi^A(1) = 1$ , and in the unequal contract, the A class plays at a rate  $\epsilon^{\phi(t;\lambda)}$ , where  $\phi(t;\lambda) := \frac{1}{1+\lambda((1-2\sigma)\rho-2t(1-\sigma)\rho)}$ , which is clearly increasing in  $\sigma$ . This implies the next proposition.

**Proposition 7.1.** *Given any  $\rho$ ,  $\gamma$ , and  $\sigma$  such that  $\rho^2\sigma(1-\sigma) > 1$ , so that contract 0 is risk dominant, but  $\epsilon(\theta)$  is as above. Then if  $t = 0$ , there exists some  $\lambda^*$  such that for any  $\lambda > \lambda^*$  the equal contract is selected.*

Suppose, now, that the government implements the policy preferences of the  $p$  percentile of the income distribution (following Benabou, 2000), choosing taxes and transfers to maximize the expected income of the members of the class to which this percentile belongs. We restrict attention to the case when  $p > \gamma$ ; the state acts as the custodian of the long-term interest of the Bs.

The state chooses a level of redistribution at the unequal contract. Each B pays a tax on the surplus it receives from each worker. Each worker receives an equal share of the total taxes collected. Thus, in each transaction, B members receive  $(1-t)(1-\sigma)\rho$ , while A members receive  $\sigma\rho + t(1-\sigma)\rho\frac{(1-\gamma)}{\gamma}\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}$ , since total taxes collected are  $t(1-\sigma)(\rho)(1-\gamma)\frac{\gamma}{1-\gamma}$ . So, for a given tax rate, the class difference in income is  $(1-2\sigma)\rho - 2t(1-\sigma)\rho$ , thus the rate of idiosyncratic play in the unequal contract is  $\epsilon^{1/(1+\lambda((1-2\sigma)\rho-2t(1-\sigma)\rho))}$ . As the tax rate rises, the rate of idiosyncratic play by the A class falls in the unequal state.

What affect does this tax have on the expected duration of the unequal contractual regime,  $\tau_0$ ? Recall that  $\tau_0 = \frac{1}{1+\mu_0(t)/\mu_1(t)}$ . We need to explore the effect of the tax on  $\mu_0$  and  $\mu_1$ . We can write the probability of exit, taking into account the effect of inequality on idiosyncratic play as:

$$\mu_0(t) = \sum_{j \geq R_{01}(t)N}^{\gamma N} \binom{\gamma N}{j} \epsilon^{j\phi(t;\lambda)} (1 - \epsilon^{\phi(t;\lambda)})^{\gamma N - j} \quad (18)$$

which, for  $\epsilon$  small, implies that we only have to concern ourselves with the minimum number of agents necessary to induce a transition. Thus (19) is on the order of  $\epsilon^{R_{01}(t)\frac{1}{1+\lambda((1-2\sigma)\rho-2t(1-\sigma)\rho)}}$ . Note that  $\mu_1(t)$  is the same as expression (4), save for the fact that  $R_{10}$  is now a function of  $t$ , since there is no change in the rate of idiosyncratic play in the equal contract.

The tax has three effects on  $\tau_0$  and they do not all have the same sign. As intended, it reduces the rate of idiosyncratic play by the As, making a transition from 0 less likely. But it has two consequences working against this effect. By reducing the difference in the B's payoffs in the two contracts it reduces  $R_{01}$ , the number of idiosyncratically responding As required to induce a transition out of the unequal contract. For analogous reasons, it also reduces  $R_{10}$ , the number of idiosyncratically responding Bs required to induce a transition out of the equal contract. However, we can show:

**Lemma 7.2.** *If  $\lambda$  is sufficiently large,  $\frac{d\tau_0}{dt} > 0$ .*

*Proof.* see Appendix. □

The maximum problem for the state must weigh the costs of the tax on the per period income of the Bs against the effect of the effect of reduced income polarization on the probability of a transition out of the unequal to the equal state  $\mu_0$ . The expected (undiscounted) income of the B class is given by

$$W_B = (1 - t)(1 - \sigma)\rho\tau_0 + (1 - \tau_0) \quad (19)$$

with the transparent first order condition

$$-(1 - \sigma)\rho\tau_0 = \frac{d\tau_0(t)}{dt}((1 - t)(1 - \sigma)\rho - 1) \quad (20)$$

The left-hand side is the marginal cost to the B-class of the tax, and if  $\frac{d\tau_0}{dt} > 0$  and  $t < \bar{t} := 1 - \frac{1}{(1-\sigma)\rho} \equiv \bar{t}$ , then the right-hand side is the marginal benefit. A tax rate in excess of  $1 - \frac{1}{(1-\sigma)\rho}$  makes the egalitarian contract preferable to the Bs so they would not benefit from a such tax if it did perpetuate the unequal contract.

We proceed by eliminating 0 and  $\bar{t}$  as solutions and appealing to well-known results about continuous functions on closed intervals. Clearly the tax rate cannot be  $\bar{t}$ , as then all the B's are indifferent between the two contracts. They can clearly do better with no tax rate at all. But  $t = 0$  cannot be optimal either, for sufficiently large  $\lambda$ . The reason is that that in (19) increasing  $\lambda$  lowers  $\tau_0$ , reducing the “marginal cost” of the tax, and raises  $\frac{d\tau_0}{dt}$ , raising the marginal benefit.

**Proposition 7.3.** *For sufficiently large  $\lambda$ , there exists a positive interior tax rate  $t^* \in (0, \bar{t})$  where  $\bar{t} = 1 - \frac{1}{\rho(1-\sigma)}$*

*Proof.* see Appendix. □

It follows readily that  $\frac{dt^*}{d\lambda} > 0$  because as we have just seen from differentiating the first order condition (19) with respect to  $\lambda$ , the marginal costs of the tax are declining in  $\lambda$  and the marginal benefits are rising. Thus as sociological or ideological conditions become more hostile to inequality one would expect far sighted governments acting on behalf of the long term interests of the B class to subject the well to do to redistributive taxation.

## 8 Extensions

Our model of institutional equilibrium selection captures some key aspects of historically observed class dynamics. Among these are the ways that smaller group size may

enhance bargaining power, the relationship between barriers to class mobility and the long run degree of income inequality, the importance of class differences in network structure and information, and the effects of state-sponsored ameliorative redistribution on the evolution of economic institutions. The model is readily extended to take account of other aspects of institutional change.

*Technological progress.* A correspondence between technologies and contracts is suggested by Marx’s famous aphorism: “The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial capitalist.” (Marx (1959 [1847])). While his account is overly simple, there does seem to be a rough correspondence between technologies and social structures as is suggested by the major institutional shifts associated with the advent of agriculture (Boyd and Richerson, 2001) and the later emergence of industrial production or the common association of slavery or latifundia agriculture with some crops and yeoman farming with others (Otiz 1963). Thus economic institutions historically associated with given technologies may differ with respect to both the size of the joint surplus  $\rho$  and the cost of entering the well off class ( $\bar{\pi}$ ). Sharecropping, for example, is commonly practiced in low productivity agricultural pursuits in which, due to, e.g., the absence of economies of scale, the cost of becoming a (small) landowner is quite minimal. Slave economies commonly comprised high productivity activities with high entry costs to the favored class (due to economies of scale in processing and marketing and the cost of acquiring personal freedom). By contrast to the institutions that it replaced, early capitalism was characterized by high levels of both productivity and cost of entry to the favored class. Our model would then predict an initial period of sharply rising inequality between employers and workers. The absence of a sustained increase in real wages during the first century of the industrial revolution in both Europe and Japan is consistent with this pattern (Allen, 2005).

*Collective action.* The only corporate actor we have considered thus far is the state; but some individual members of each class may choose to act in unison, either best responding or playing idiosyncratically. The members of a trade union may decide to work under the current contract, or to refuse to do so. Where members of such organizations may commit themselves to acting in unison, dynamics are affected in two ways. First the effective size of the class is reduced to the number of autonomously acting entities. The effect is to increase the fraction of time spent governed by the contract favored by the affected class. . The second effect is to alter the rate of idiosyncratic play, the sign of the effect depending on the structure of the social interactions among the subgroups with each class. Models of social networks in which one’s behavior is influenced by (but not identical to) one’s neighbors provide a framework to take account of the fact that corporate bodies such as trade unions and business associations are rarely able to perfectly enforce action in unison (Young, 2002, Durlauf, 2001).

*Endogenous barriers to class mobility.* Suppose that  $\bar{\pi}$  is the cost of capital necessary to hire the average number of As employed by a B, or  $\kappa\gamma/(1 - \gamma)$  here  $\kappa$  is the capital required to hire a single worker. Now as  $\gamma$  increases, the cross-class couple, as before becomes richer, but the minimal amount required for their two children to become Bs

also rises. So the cost of upward mobility will vary with the size of the working class:  $(d\bar{\pi})/(d\gamma) > 0$ . As a result  $2\bar{\pi}(\gamma) - y_c(\gamma)$  need not be monotonically declining in  $\gamma$ , so more than one change in  $\text{sgn}(2\bar{\pi}(\gamma) - y_c(\gamma))$  may occur over the interval  $\gamma \in (\frac{1}{2}, 1)$ . Thus, there may be multiple endogenously determined class sizes for a given contract, the same  $\sigma$  and  $\rho$  supporting a highly unequal society in which each B profits from interacting with many As and a more egalitarian one in which Bs interact with few As.

The cost of upward class mobility may also be endogenous due to the actions of the state. We have modeled state redistribution in the interest of perpetuating the status quo (unequal) contract by attenuating the associated income differences. Similar policies have been widely adopted to reduce  $\bar{\pi}$ , the (private) cost of upward class mobility. Included are public education, meritocratic promotion rules and policies to relax the credit constraints facing the less well off. Notice, however, that these policies may have unintended effects. They could, as intended, succeed in raising  $\tau_0$  if they reduced the income differences associated with the unequal contract, lowering  $\lambda$  and hence reducing the responsiveness of the As idiosyncratic play to class disparities in income. But by reducing the equilibrium size of the A-class and the payoffs to the Bs in the unequal contract, these policies reduce  $R_{01}$  thereby facilitating transitions out of the unequal state.

*Tensions between bargaining power and political power.* We have seen (proposition 4.1) that a reduction in the size of the A-class confers advantages in bargaining to the As. But with the extension of suffrage to male (and eventually all) workers, the political power of the A-class is likely to increase with its size. Once we incorporate into the model a state whose managers are selected in competitive elections with an inclusive electorate, a tension emerges between the requisites for success in private contractual bargaining (favoring small size) and success in the public determination of the tax and other policies that shape these bargains. This is another reason for the common observation that trade unions benefit by being exclusive, while their affiliated political parties benefit by being inclusive.

*Inheritance systems, marital assortment, and demographic structure.* For simplicity we abstracted from marital sorting, income pooling within couples, and sex differences and we assumed equal inheritance to each of two members of the next generation for both classes. Taking account of each produces interesting variants of the above dynamic. For example, as is clear from (9) marital assortment reduces the number of cross-class couples (to less than  $\gamma(1 - \gamma)$ ) but does not affect the equilibrium class sizes. However, fewer cross-class marriages could affect mobility if income pooling in couples and the response of idiosyncratic play to income polarization are taken into account. The reason is that with income pooling the average difference between the income of the As and Bs is increasing in the degree of marital assortment. Another example is provided by primogeniture. If the richer class produces more than two surviving offspring (as they surely did prior to the demographic transition e.g. Borgerhoff-Mulder 1986, Herlihy and Klapische-Zuber 1985, Stone 1977, and Betzig 1986) then primogeniture, by restricting the size of the B-class, will support higher levels of inequality.

## 9 Conclusion

Our hybrid of political economy models and evolutionary models of equilibrium selection has sought to highlight the fact that institutional change is often conflictual and initially propelled by the intentional yet substantially uncoordinated actions of a large number of actors. By contrast to these “bottom up” processes, some institutional transitions are the result of highly centralized bargaining among a small number of political parties or other corporate actors, better captured by standard political economy models. Other transitions may result from random experimentation by large numbers of actors (rather than intentional deviance from the status quo) and are best represented in standard stochastic evolutionary models. Because we do not have models that integrate both the bottom up and the top down aspects of institutional change with the unintentional and intentional sources of deviation from the status quo, research on institutional dynamics necessarily relies on a set of models each designed to illuminate particular aspects that may be more or less relevant in given historical cases.

While we therefore do not claim generality for our model, we think that it nonetheless contributes new insights not available in existing models. For example, it provides a historically plausible dynamic that under some conditions results in efficient institutions being selected. But it also shows that highly unequal and inefficient institutions may outlast (in an evolutionary sense) more egalitarian and efficient institutions if the barriers to upward class mobility are sufficiently great.

We think that this model may illuminate such paradoxes as the millennia-long stability of high levels of class inequality in ancient civilizations (Trigger (2003), Yoffe (2005)) and the greater instability of extreme class inequality since the emergence of capitalism (Hobsbawm and Rude 1967, Hobsbawm 1964), the dynamic of highly decentralized popular unrest and elite response during the French Revolution (Markoff, Soboul, 1964, and Rude 1959) and the U.S. civil rights movement (MacAdam 1986). The model may also illuminate the emergence of some early welfare states (e.g. Bismarkian Germany, Mares (2004)) and systems of public education (e.g. United States, Katz (1968)), and in addition to the case of the end of apartheid, the legalization and recognition of trade unions in the U.S. (Freeman 1998) and the end of Communist rule in Poland (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999). But the historical work required to say if we are right remains to be done.

## 10 Appendix

### 10.1 Proof of Lemma 5.2

*Proof.*

$$\frac{d\mu_0(t)}{dt} = \ln(\epsilon)\epsilon^{R_{01}(t)\phi(t;\lambda)} \left( \frac{dR_{01}(t)}{dt} \phi(t;\lambda) + R_{01}(t) \frac{d\phi(t;\lambda)(t)}{dt} \right) \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{d\mu_1(t)}{dt} = \ln(\epsilon)\epsilon^{R_{10}(t)} \frac{dR_{10}(t)}{dt} = \ln(\epsilon)\epsilon^{R_{10}(t)} \frac{-(1-\sigma)\rho}{(1+\sigma\rho+t(1-\sigma)\rho)^2} > 0 \quad (22)$$

Since  $\phi(t, \lambda)$  becomes small as  $\lambda$  becomes large, and  $\frac{d\phi(t, \lambda)}{dt}$  is increasing and bounded above by  $\frac{2(1-\sigma)\rho}{(1-2\sigma)\rho-2t(1-\sigma)\rho} > 0$  in  $\lambda$ . Then it is clear that for  $\lambda$  sufficiently large, (20) is negative. Thus we can establish that:

$$\frac{\frac{d\mu_0(t)}{dt}}{\frac{d\mu_1(t)}{dt}} < 0 < \frac{\mu_0(t)}{\mu_1(t)} \implies \frac{d\frac{\mu_0(t)}{\mu_1(t)}}{dt} < 0 \quad (23)$$

Since the first condition clearly holds, as  $\mu_0$  and  $\mu_1$  are both greater than 0, we have  $\frac{d\tau_0}{dt} > 0$ . □

## 10.2 Proof of Proposition 5.3

*Proof.* If we differentiate (18) with respect to  $\lambda$  we get:

$$-(1-\sigma)\rho \frac{d\tau_0}{d\lambda} + \frac{d^2\tau_0}{dt d\lambda} ((1-t)(1-\sigma)\rho - 1) \quad (24)$$

And we can readily see that:

$$\frac{d\tau}{d\lambda} = -\frac{1}{(1+\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1})^2} \frac{d\mu_0}{d\lambda} \frac{1}{\mu_1} \quad (25)$$

$$\frac{d^2\tau}{dt d\lambda} = \frac{2}{(1+\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1})^3} \frac{d\mu_0}{d\lambda} \frac{d\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1}}{dt} - \frac{d^2\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1}}{dt d\lambda} \frac{1}{(1+\frac{\mu_0}{\mu_1})^2} \quad (26)$$

So, noting that:

$$\frac{d\mu_0}{d\lambda} = \ln(\epsilon) \epsilon^{\phi(t; \lambda) R_{01}(t)} R_{01}(t) \frac{\phi(t; \lambda)}{d\lambda} > 0 \quad (27)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{d^2\mu_0}{dt d\lambda} &= \ln(\epsilon) (\ln(\epsilon) \epsilon^{\phi(t; \lambda) R_{01}(t)} R_{01}(t) \frac{\phi(t; \lambda)}{d\lambda} (\frac{dR_{01}(t)}{dt} \phi(t; \lambda) + R_{01}(t) \frac{d\phi(t; \lambda)(t)}{dt}) \\ &\quad + \epsilon^{\phi(t; \lambda) R_{01}(t)} (\frac{dR_{01}(t)}{dt} \frac{d\phi(t; \lambda)}{d\lambda} + R_{01}(t) \frac{d^2\phi(t; \lambda)(t)}{dt d\lambda}) > 0 \end{aligned}$$

The last inequality follows since  $\phi$  is decreasing in  $\lambda$ , and  $\frac{d\phi}{dt}$  is increasing in  $\lambda$ . Thus we get that the derivative is increasing at 0. Thus, since we have shown that the government's value function is not maximized at 0 or  $\bar{t}$ , there must exist an interior maximum  $t^*$ . □

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