

# Representation in the Legislative and the Executive as Substitutes: Evidence from Argentina

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- ▶ Why? Smaller, rural regions risk marginalization by larger, urban ones if representation is fully proportional to population
- ▶ Legislative malapportionment as an institutional compromise to integrate rural elites/regions (e.g. *caudillos*) into state and appease secessionist tendencies in the 1800s
  - ▶ Upper chamber malapportionment: 2 senators per state from the US to Argentina
  - ▶ **Lower chamber malapportionment:** each province receives at least  $n$  *diputados*/representatives (currently 5 in Argentina’s *Cámara de Diputados*)

**Why would the largest regions (e.g., Buenos Aires, Sao Paulo) accept to be persistently underrepresented?**

# Hypothesis

- ▶ **Large, urban regions may recoup their losses in the cabinet**
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- ▶ **H<sub>0</sub>** Otherwise, representation in the legislature and the cabinet may be **complements**
  - ▶ Large districts are doubly penalized in Indian states because large parties “focus on winning relatively small constituencies”, and MPs from large parties are more likely to become state ministers (Bhavnani)

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  - ▶ Variables: province, town, and years of of birth/death; mandate time span; occupation in government; party affiliation; educational trajectories; linkages with business association

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

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



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





# Representation ( $s_i - p_i$ ) in Chamber and Cabinet





► Substitutes when we consider all provinces



► Complements when we exclude the hegemon

**Why would Buenos Aires accept to be persistently underrepresented?**

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Because it is heavily overrepresented in the cabinet

## Puzzle 2

**What are the reasons for Buenos Aires' overrepresentation?  
How does it manage to regularly dominate the cabinet?**

## A proximate cause of Buenos Aires' cabinet dominance

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
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1. When the federation was formed (1860s):
  - ▶ Main effects of 1853 constitutional design: smaller provinces are overrepresented in the Chamber (and also Senate and Electoral College) while Buenos Aires maintains important economic prerogatives upon joining the federation in 1860 “from a position of supremacy” (Gibson & Falletti)
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  - 2.1 Elite networks, party cadres
    - ▶ “UCR and peronismo nacen en Buenos Aires y se expanden hacia atrás, con lo que tienen muchos cuadros en BA” (Máscolo)
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    - ▶ Smaller provinces have long been partly compensated via malapportionment *and* redistributive transfers

## Two contrasting cases from the early decades (-1915)

1. **Buenos Aires' dominance:** Bartolomé Mitre (1860s) becomes President when Buenos Aires joins the federation with support from all provinces even though he is a *porteño* and a well-known advocate of Buenos Aires' interests. How?
  - ▶ His reforms are aimed at unifying the nation, i.e., he is not a secessionist and a Bs As presidency further reduces this concern among provincial caudillos
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2. **Provinces' dominance:** Liga de Gobernadores formalized in 1871 as a reaction to Buenos Aires' strength
  - ▶ 9 provinces that form the “anti-Buenos Aires” Partido Autonomista Nacional (PAN), which rules until 1916
  - ▶ Provinces military defeat Buenos Aires in 1880
  - ▶ No presidents from Buenos Aires 1868-1890 (still overrepresented in the cabinet but at times less so)



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- ▶ Buenos Aires has long concentrated (1) the national elite networks and (2) the cadres of the Partido Justicialista (Peronism) and the UCR that populate cabinets (mechanisms) (Gibson & Calvo)

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  - ▶ By relying on the support of overrepresented smaller provinces to pass neoliberal legislation
  - ▶ Consequently, nearly 50% of his ministers were **not** from Buenos Aires

# Discussion

- ▶ Puzzle 2 (the sources of Buenos Aires' executive advantage) needs more work
  - ▶ We can illustrate our mechanisms (elite networks/party cadres, competence) using our ministerial biographies
  - ▶ But in my mind still puzzling how much it dominates the cabinet
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  2. Legislature should somewhat matter (vs. dictatorships)
  3. Presidential regimes (Brazil) > parliamentary regimes (India) because the former have separation of origin
    - ▶ *Política do café com leite*

**Dios está en todas partes, pero atiende en Buenos Aires**

[God is everywhere, but he takes care of/assists from Buenos Aires]