



No. S-097767  
Vancouver Registry

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

IN THE MATTER OF:

*THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION ACT, R.S.B.C. 1986, c. 68*

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

*THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS*

AND IN THE MATTER OF:

A REFERENCE BY THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR IN COUNCIL SET OUT IN  
ORDER IN COUNCIL NO. 533 DATED OCTOBER 22, 2009 CONCERNING  
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF s. 293 OF THE *CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA*,  
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46

**AFFIDAVIT OF SHOSHANA GROSSBARD**


I, Shoshana Grossbard, of the City of San Diego, in the State of California, MAKE OATH AND SAY:


1. I am a Professor at the San Diego State University in Economics. I hold areas of specialization in Polygamy, Household Economics, Economics of the Family, Gender Studies, Labour Economics, Sociological Economics and Anthropological Economics.
2. I received my Bachelor of Arts in Economics, Sociology from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.
3. I hold a Ph.D. in Economics (Labour and Anthropological) from the University of Chicago.
4. I have held visiting professorships at Bar-Ilan University of Isreal, Paris I/Sorbonne and Jourdan/Grandes Ecoles of Paris, University of Zaragoza of Spain and CESifo of Munich.
5. I also hold professional positions as a Consultant for the Urban Institute in Washington, DC and as a member of the Board of the European Network on Economics of Religion.
6. To date, I have authored numerous publications on the topic of Polygamy.
7. The above qualifications, amongst other qualifications, are set out in my curriculum vitae, a true copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A" to this my Affidavit.
8. My works as an economist explain the economic effects polygamy has on women in polygamous communities in various cultures and religions around the world. My initial

works on the study of polygamy found that polygamy was a neutral factor with respect to the economic wellbeing of women. Over 35 years of study, my opinion has changed and I now believe polygamy to have a negative impact on the economic wellbeing of women, amongst other things.

- 9. On July 15 of 2010, I was retained by the Miller Thomson LLP to prepare an expert report to explain the economic effects of polygamy. I have been retained for the purpose of providing information to the Supreme Court of British Columbia in this Reference.
- 10. I understand that in providing my opinion to the Court, I have a duty to assist the Court and that I am not to be an advocate for any party. I have prepared my report in conformity with that duty.
- 11. I make this Affidavit for the purposes of providing information and opinion to this Court.
- 12. Attached as **Exhibit "B"** to this my Affidavit is the report that I have prepared for the purposes of this Reference. It is based on my previous work and writing. I am the sole author of this report. The report sets forth my opinion regarding the subject of polygamy.
- 13. My report discusses the following five central issues related to polygamy: (1) Economic analysis of polygamy and its effect on women; (2) Institutions associated with polygamy that reduce women's wellbeing; (3) Institutions found in polygamous societies aimed at alleviating the problems caused by polygamy (indirect recognition that there are such problems); (4) Other undesirable consequences of polygamy and undesirable results for children; and (5) Potential unintended consequences for Canada, were Canada to legalize polygamy.

SWORN before me at the City of San Diego, in the State of California, this 16<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2010.

  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 A Notary Public


  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Skoshana Grossbard




7-16-2010

**EXHIBIT "A"**  
**TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF**  
**SHOSHANA GROSSBARD**  
**JULY 16, 2010**

This is Exhibit "A" referred to in the  
affidavit of Shoshana Grossbard  
made before me on July 16, 2010



Notary Public for San Diego  
County, California, USA



7-16-2010

## RESUME

June 28, 2010

GROSSBARD, Shoshana Amyra  
Department of Economics  
San Diego State University  
San Diego, CA 92182-4485 cell (619) 992 3969  
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<http://www-roban.sdsu.edu/faculty/sgs/>

CITIZENSHIP USA and Belgium

### EDUCATION

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Degree</u>	<u>Fields</u>
Hebrew University, Jerusalem	B.A.	Economics, Sociology
University of Chicago	Ph.D.	Economics (Labor and Anthropological)

### POSITIONS

<u>Institution</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Dates</u>
San Diego State University, Economics	Professor	1981-Pr
Bar-Ilan University, Israel	Visiting Professor	March 2008
Paris I /Sorbonne and Jourdan/Grandes Ecoles, Paris	Visiting Professor	Feb 2008
University of Zaragoza, Spain	Visiting Professor	Feb '08, May '10
IZA, Bonn	Visiting Scholar	Summer 2007
CESifo, Munich	Visiting Professor	March 2007
Princeton University, Office of Population Research	Visiting Collaborator	2003-4
Columbia University, Economics	Visiting Scholar	2002-3
Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Paris, France	Visiting Scholar	March 2002
Universite de Paris II, Pantheon-Assas, France	Visiting Scholar	1999, 2000
University of California, San Diego, Economics	Visiting Scholar	1995-1996
Bar-Ilan University, Israel, Economics	Lecturer	1983-84
Tel-Aviv University, Israel, Economics/Sociology	Lecturer	1983-84
Ctr for Advanced Studies in Behavioral Science, Stanford	Fellow	1980-81
Population Research Laboratory, USC	Research Associate	1978-80
Occidental College, Economics	Assistant Professor	1977-78
Pitzer College, Economics	Instructor	1976-77

**AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION:** Household Economics, Economics of the Family, Gender Studies, Labor Economics, Sociological Economics, Anthropological Economics

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE:** Graduate (research guidance for MA and Ph.D.) and Undergraduate

**LANGUAGES OF INSTRUCTION:** English, French, Hebrew, Spanish, and Dutch

### OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Founding Editor, *Review of Economics of the Household*, Published by Springer, 2001-present  
Consultant, Urban Institute, Washington DC, 2008-present  
Fellow, CESifo Research Network, 2007-present  
Fellow, IZA, Institute for the Study of Labor, 2006-present

Member, Board of the European Network on the Economics of Religion, 2006-present  
 Member, Executive Board, *Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics*, 1984-present  
 Member, Women's Studies Graduate Associate Faculty, SDSU, 2000-present  
 Member, Editorial Board, *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 2000-present  
 Co-organizer, Meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, S. Diego, August 2010 (with Roger Frantz)  
 Chair, Ph D tribunal of Jose Ignacio Gimenez, University of Zaragoza, Spain, May 2010  
 Presenter, first annual lecture about the family, TheFamilyWatch, Madrid, Spain, May 31, 2010  
 Member, PhD committee of Aycan Celikaksoy, Aarhus School of Business, 2006  
 Member, Program Committee of the *European Society for Population Economics*, 2005-2006  
 Chair, Dorothy S. Thomas Award Committee, *Population Association of America*, 2004  
 Principal organizer, Conference in Honor of Jacob Mincer, Columbia University, July 2002 (with James Heckman and Nachum Sicherman)  
 Member, Dorothy S. Thomas Award Committee, Population Association of America, 2002-2004  
 Member, Ph. D. thesis committee of Anne Solaz, University of Paris-Nanterre, 2000  
 Principal organizer, Meetings of the Society for the Advancement of Behavioral Economics, S.Diego, June 1999 (with Christopher Clague)  
 Member, Ph.D. thesis committee of Gaelle Leguirric, University of Paris-II/Assass, 1999-2002  
 International Advisory Editor, *Journal of Bioeconomics*, 1999-2002  
 Co-organizer, Conference on "Contemporary Marriage: Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution," Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, CA, August 1982 (with Kingsley Davis)  
 Researcher, Labor and Population Studies, the RAND Corporation, Summer 1976  
 Researcher, National Insurance Institute of Israel, 1969-71  
 Referee/Reviewer for the American Economic Review, American Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Cambridge University Press, Current Anthropology, Demography, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Economic Inquiry, Economic Journal, Economic Psychology, Feminist Economics, German Israeli Foundation for Scientific Research and Development, Journal of Bioeconomics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Education, Journal of the European Economic Association, Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Labor Economics, Journal of Mexican Studies, Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Population Economics, Journal of Socio-Economics, Law and Social Inquiry, MIT Press, National Science Foundation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, Social Forces, University of Chicago Press, and Yale Law Journal.

#### HONORS

Included in Who's Who in America, 2000 Outstanding Intellectuals of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, Who's Who in American Education, Global Who's Who Directory in rationalexpectations.com, Who's Who in the World, World's Who's Who of Women, Who's Who in Science and Engineering, Who's Who in the West, Who's Who in Finance and Business, Dictionary of International Biography (1985), and Personalities of the Americas (1987).

#### GRANTS

Small Grant from the Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques, Paris, France, March 2002; Small Grant from Research Center on Jewish Law and Economics, Bar Ilan University, Israel, 2001; Grant for Research on "Using the 1990 Census to Estimate Marriage Squeeze Effects," from the San Diego State

University Foundation, 1994-1995; Grant for Research on "Women's Labor Supply and Marriage," from the Sapir Center for Development, Tel-Aviv University, 1983-84

**PUBLICATIONS** (also under Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, and Amyra Grossbard)

**A. Sole-Author Book:** Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, On the Economics of Marriage - A Theory of Marriage, Labor and Divorce. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993.

**B. Edited Books:**

1. Shoshana Grossbard, Jacob Mincer: A Pioneer of Modern Labor Economics. New York: Springer, 2006. Includes chapters by Jacob Mincer, Gary Becker and James J Heckman. I wrote the Preface and a chapter on the New Home Economics at Columbia and Chicago.
2. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Marriage and the Economy: Theory and Evidence from Advanced Industrial Societies Foreword by Jacob Mincer. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. "Table of Contents" Includes 2 chapters I wrote: Introduction, and Marriage and Work for Pay (with S. Neuman).
3. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Christopher Clague, On the Expansion of Economics. Foreword by Jack Hirshleifer. Armonk, N.J.: M.E. Sharpe. 2001. "Table of Contents"[link to CONTexp] Includes 4 chapters I wrote: Introduction (with C. Clague); the Economics and Sociology of Marriage; A Demographer on the Cusp between Economics and Sociology: David Heer; and a Conclusion.
4. Kingsley Davis in association with Grossbard-Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, Contemporary Marriage: Comparative Perspectives on a Changing Institution. New York: Russell Sage Publications, 1985. Includes 1 chapter I wrote: "Marriage Squeezes, Cohabitation, and the Feminist Revolution".

**C. Journal Editor:** Founding editor, *Review of Economics of the Household*, Springer, see <http://www.springerlink.com/content/1573-7152/?k>

**D. Special Issues Editor:**

1. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, Special issue on Household and Gender Economics, Vol. 31(1), 2002.
2. *Journal of Bioeconomics*, Special issue: Bioeconomics of Sex, Marriage, and Family, Vol. 4(3), 2002.
3. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Special issue on Economic Development and Cultural Institutions. (with Christopher Clague), vol. 573, 2001.
4. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, Symposium on the Reorientation of Economics (with Christopher Clague), vol. 30(1), 2001.

**E. Articles (not including Chapters in own Books and Book Reviews):**

1. Shoshana Grossbard. "How 'Chicagoan' are Gary Becker's Economic Models of Marriage?" *J of History of Economic Thought*, forthcoming, September 2010.
2. David Bishai and Shoshana Grossbard. "Far Above Rubies: The Association between Bride Price and Extramarital Sexual Relations in Uganda", *J of Population Economics*, forthcoming, Published online: DOI No. 10.1007/s00148-008-0226-3.
3. Shoshana Grossbard and Lisa Jepsen. "The economics of gay and lesbian couples: Introduction to a special issue on gay and lesbian households." *Review of Economics of the Household*, 6:311-326, 2008.
4. Olivia Ekert-Jaffe and Shoshana Grossbard. "Does Community Property Discourage Unpartnered Births?" *European J of Political Economy* 24(1):25-40, 2008.

5. Shoshana Grossbard and Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes. "Marriage Markets and Women's Labor Force Participation," *Review of Economics of the Household* 5:249-278, 2007.
6. Shoshana Grossbard. "Repack the Household: A Comment on Robert Ellickson's Unpacking the Household," in *Yale Law Journal Pocket Edition*, at <http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/16/grossbard.html> April, 2007.
7. Shoshana Grossbard. "Competitive Marriage Markets and Jewish Law," in *The Economics of Judaism and Jewish Human Capital*, edited by Carmel U. Chiswick and Tikva Lecker with Nava Kahana. Ramat-Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan University Press, 2006.
8. Shoshana Grossbard. "A Theory of Women's Welfare Dependency, Marriage, and Labor Supply," *Labour* 19:211-241, 2005.
9. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Model of Labour Supply, Household Production, and Marriage" in *Advances in Household Economics, Consumer Behaviour and Economic Policy*, edited by Tran Van Hoa. London: Ashgate Publishing, 2005.
10. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "From the Editor's Desk: REHO and the New Home Economics." *Review of Economics of the Household*, 1:5-7, 2003.
11. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Consumer Theory with Competitive Markets for Work in Marriage," *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 31(6): 609-645, 2003.
12. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Xuanning Fu. "Women's Labor Force Participation and Status Exchange in Intermarriage: An Empirical Study in Hawaii," *Journal of Bioeconomics*, 4(3): 241-268, 2002.
13. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Biology versus Economics and Culture in Research on the Family," *Journal of Bioeconomics*, 4(3): 191-4, 2002.
14. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Introduction to Special Issue on Household and Gender Economics," *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 31(1), 2002.
15. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Irma Adelman, A Pioneer in the Expansion of Economics: An Interview," *Feminist Economics*, 8(1): 101-116, 2002.
16. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "The New Home Economics at Columbia and Chicago," *Feminist Economics*, 7, 7(3) :103-130, 2001.
17. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Christopher Clague. "What is Economics?" *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 30: 1-6, 2001.
18. Christopher Clague and Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Preface on Economic Development and Cultural Institutions," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 573: 8-15, 2001.
19. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Bertrand Lemennicier. "Marriage Contracts and the Law-and-Economics of Marriage: an Austrian Perspective," *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 28: 665-690, 1999.
20. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Marriage, Theories of," in *Elgar Companion to Feminist Economics*, edited by Meg Lewis and Janice Peterson. Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1999.
21. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "New Home Economics," in *Encyclopedia of Political Economy*, edited by Phillip O'Hara. London: Routledge, 1999.
22. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Marriage," in *Encyclopedia of Political Economy*, edited by Phillip O'Hara. London: Routledge, 1999.
23. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Clive W. Granger. "Women's Jobs and Marriage, Baby-Boom versus Baby-Bust," *Population*, 53: 731-52, September 1998 (in French).
24. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "The Extra Burden of Moslem Wives: Clues from Israeli Women's Labor Supply," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 46: 491-518, April 1998. [reprinted in Jona Schellekens and Jon Anson (eds.), *Israel's*

- Destiny: Fertility and Mortality in a Divided Society, Schnitzer Studies in Israeli Society, Volume 12. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, 2007].
25. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman and Matthew Neideffer. "Women's Hours of Work and Marriage Market Imbalances," in Economics of the Family and Family Policies, edited by Inga Persson and Christina Jonung, London: Routledge, 1997.
  26. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Evelyn Lehrer and J. William Leasure. "Comment on a Theory of the Value of Children," Demography, Vol. 33, 1996.
  27. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Do Not Sell Marriage Short," Feminist Economics, 1(1), 1995.
  28. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman. "Marriage Market Models" in M. Tommasi and K. Ierulli (eds.), The New Economics of Human Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. [in Spanish: "Modelos de Mercado Matrimonial" en Economía y sociedad Cambridge University Press, 2000]
  29. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman, Dafna Izraeli and Shoshana Neuman. "When do Spouses Support a Career? A Human Capital Analysis of Israeli Managers and their Spouses," Journal of Socio-Economics, 23(1): 189-207, 1994.
  30. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "Cross-Productivity Effects of Education and Origin on Earnings--Do They Really Reflect Productivity?" in J. Gerber, R. Frantz, and H. Singh (eds.), Handbook of Behavioral Economics, Vol. II. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1991.
  31. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "Earnings and Ethnic Origin: The Effect of Wife's Ethnic Origin on Husband's Earnings," Studies in Israel's Economy 1988, pp. 39-51, The Israeli Economic Association, Jerusalem, 1989 (in Hebrew).
  32. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "An Economist's Approach to Women's Private and Public Roles," in M. Ben-Peretz and D. Kalekin-Fishman (eds.), Proceedings of an International Conference on Private Woman-Public Work. Haifa: Haifa University, 1989.
  33. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "Women's Labor Supply and Marital Choice," Journal of Political Economy, 96:1294-1302, December 1988.
  34. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Virtue, Work and Marriage" in S. Maital (ed.), Applied Behavioral Economics. New York: Wheatsheaf, 1988.
  35. Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Female Work and Leadership in the Kibbutz: Some Empirical Tests" in L. Shamgar-Handelman and R. Palomba (eds.), Alternative patterns of Family Life in Modern Societies. Rome: IRP, 1987.
  36. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Marriage and Productivity--An Interdisciplinary Analysis" in B. Gilad and S. Kaish (eds.), Handbook of Behavioral Economics. Greenwich: JAI Press, 1986.
  37. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Economic Behavior, Marriage and Fertility: Two Lessons from Polygyny," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7:415-424, 1986.
  38. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman and Shoshana Neuman. "Economic Behavior, Marriage and Religiosity," Journal of Behavioral Economics, Spring/Summer 1986.
  39. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Economics, Judaism, and Marriage," Dinei Israel, A Journal of Science and Jewish Law, 1986 (in Hebrew)
  40. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labor and Marriage," Economic Journal, 94(4): 863-882, 1984.
  41. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Market Approach to Intermarriage," Papers in Jewish Demography, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Jerusalem, 1983.



42. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "On the Role and Determinants of Bride Price: Comment," Current Anthropology, 24(2): 210, 1983.
43. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "A Theory of Marriage Formality: The Case of Guatemala," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 30(4): 813-830, 1982.
44. David M. Heer and Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "The Impact of the Female Marriage Squeeze and the Contraceptive Revolution on Sex Roles and the Women's Liberation Movement in the United States, 1960 to 1975," Journal of Marriage and the Family, 43(1): 49-65, 1981.
45. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "Gary Becker's Theory of the Family--Some Interdisciplinary Considerations," Sociology and Social Research, 66(1): 1-11, 1981.
46. Amyra Grossbard-Shechtman. "The Economics of Polygamy," in J. DaVanzo and J. Simon (eds.), Research in Population Economics, Vol. II. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1980.
47. Amyra Grossbard. "On the Production Mentality and Communal Formation: Comment," Current Anthropology, June 1980.
48. Amyra Grossbard. "Towards a Marriage Between Economics and Anthropology and A General Theory of Marriage," Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Review, 68(2):33-37, 1978.
49. Amyra Grossbard. "Development and Human Economics: Comment," Current Anthropology, March 1978.
50. Amyra Grossbard. "Reply to Clignet-Sween and Cohen," Current Anthropology, March 1977.
51. Amyra Grossbard. "An Economic Analysis of Polygamy: The Case of Maiduguri," Current Anthropology, 17 (4): 701-707, 1976.

### Book Reviews

- The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce*, by Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn, in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 41 (4), 2003.
- Lone Motherhood in Twentieth-Century Britain--From Footnote to Front Page*. by Kathleen Kiernan, Hilary Land, and Jane Lewis, in J of Socio-Economics, Vol. 29 No. 6, pp. 597-99, 2000
- Working in the Macroeconomy*, by Martin F.J. Prachowny, in J of Economic Literature, 1999.
- The Feminine Economy and Economic Man*, by Shirley Burggraf, in J of Socio-Economics, 27(4), 1998.
- Economics of the Family*, by Alessandro Cigno, in J of Economic Behavior and Organization, February 1993.
- No Step Backward*, by P. Petrick, in J of Economic History, December 1988.
- Too Many Women: The Sex Ratio Question*, by M. Guttentag and P. F. Secord, in Sociology and Social Research, 68(3): 390-391, 1984.
- Microeconomics and Human Behavior*, by D. A. Alhadeff, in J of Economic Literature, June 1983.

### MEDIA

#### Videos

- First annual lecture about the family, theFamilyWatch, Madrid, Spain, May 31, 2010  
<http://www.youtube.com/user/TheFamilyWatch#p/a/u/1/K1sF-tAwdlY>  
 Interview on Law and Economics of Families, theFamilyWatch, (in English)  
<http://www.youtube.com/user/TheFamilyWatch#p/u/3/hZpp1i4JrkY>

#### Writings for the Media

- "Labour force participation of women and « marriage market » in the USA" *Essais et Debats, La Vie des Idées Website*, <http://www.laviedesidees.fr/Labour-force-participation-of.html>, March 20, 2009
- "Dispatch on the leisure/work debate", *Freakonomics blog*, June 11, 2007  
<http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/another-economist-heard-from-in-the-leisurework-debate/>
- "Women in the work force - Why their numbers relative to men are dropping" *San Diego Union Tribune*, March 23 2006
- "Some Insights Regarding Success in the Economics Profession," *Newsletter of the Committee on the Status of Women in the Economics Profession*, Winter 2001: 5,7.

### Interviews

- Interview in La Razon, Madrid, June 21, 2010 <http://www.thefamilywatch.org/tfw/tfw-0066-es.php> (in Spanish)
- Cited on Rita Watson's blog, *Providence Journal*, "Wall Street to Main Street: Looking for love"  
[http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\\_watson3\\_05-03-09\\_C1E72MM\\_v13.3e69dcl.html](http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT_watson3_05-03-09_C1E72MM_v13.3e69dcl.html)
- Interviewed for article on love and money, front page article, *S Diego Union Tribune*, Feb 14, 2009
- Interviewed for "Economy affects divorce rates", TV News 6, San Diego,  
<http://www.sandiego6.com/news/local/story/Economy-Affects-Divorce-Rate/ttQGcuYtEiGy2iWdu3eBg.cspX>, January 12, 2009
- Interviewed for "Poor economy keeping some from expanding family", on Channel 10 news, San Diego  
<http://www.10news.com/video/18303874/?raf=sand>, December 17, 2008

### **CEPR, CES, and IZA WORKING PAPERS**

- "How 'Chicagooan' are Gary Becker's Economic Models of Marriage?" CESifo Working Papers 2637, May 2009 [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1400633](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1400633)
- David Bishai and Shoshana Grossbard "Far Above Rubies: The Association between Bride Price and Extramarital Sexual Relations in Uganda," IZA Discussion Papers 2982, August 2007
- Olivia Ekert-Jaffe and Shoshana Grossbard "Does Community Property Discourage Unpartnered Births?" IZA Discussion Papers 2816, June 2007
- Shoshana Grossbard & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes "Marriage Markets and Women's Labor Force Participation," IZA Discussion Papers 2722, April 2007
- Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman & Shoshana Neuman "The Extra Burden of Moslem Wives: Clues from Israeli Women's Labour Supply," CEPR Discussion Papers 1807, 1998.

### **SELECTED PAST PRESENTATIONS**

- "Income Pooling by Couples as Compensation for Work in Household Production" (with Jens Bonke and Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes), ESPE meetings, Essen, June 2010.
- « Is Gary Becker the Father of Unitary Models of the Household? », OFCE, Sciences-Po, Paris, March 2010
- "Racial Discrimination and Household Chores" (with Jose Ignacio Gimenez and Alberto Molina) presented at the workshop on the economics of couples, University of Cergy, France, December 2009. Paper also presented at seminars at University of Calgary, University of Alberta, and University of Nevada, Reno.
- "Compensating Differentials in Time-Use of Couples" (with Jose Ignacio Gimenez and Alberto Molina) presented at the annual meetings of the European Economic Association Conference, Barcelona, August 2009.

- “How ‘Chicagoan’ are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of Marriage?” presented at the annual meetings of IAFFE (International Association for Feminist Economics), Boston, June 2009.
- “How ‘Chicagoan’ are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of Marriage?” presented at the annual STOREP (Associazione Italiana per la Storia dell’Economia Politica) meetings, Firenze, June 2009.
- “Complete Income Pooling and Quasi-Wages for Household Producers” (with Jens Bonke) presented at Labor and Development Workshop, MIT, April 2008; Department of Economics, UC Irvine, May 2008; AND at the Workshop on the labor market behavior of couples, Nice, June 2008.
- “Quasi-Wages and Income Pooling.” (with Jens Bonke), Seminaire Travail et Microeconomie Appliquee, Paris I, February 2008 AND University of Tilburg, February 2008.
- “A Test of Robert Willis’ Theory of Non-Marital Childbearing” Seminar on Gender, Paris I/Sorbonne, February 2008
- “Quasi-Wages in Marriage” Workshop on Economics of the Family, University of Zaragoza, Spain, February 2008
- “Marriage Markets and Economic Development” presented at the Department of Economics, University of Warsaw, March 2007
- “Marriage Markets and Married Women’s Labor Force Participation” (with Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, SDSU), presented at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, Stockholm University; the Institute of Social and Economic Research, ISER, University of Essex, U.K. February-March 2007
- “Far Above Rubies: The Association between Bride Price and Extramarital Sexual Relations in Uganda” (with David Bishai), presented at the Econometric Society, ASSA meetings, Chicago, January 2007
- “Religion and Unpartnered Births.” (with Olivia Ekert-Jaffe), presented at the Association for the Study of Religion, Economics, and Culture, Portland, Oregon, Oct 2006
- “Does Community Property Discourage Unpartnered Births?” (with Olivia Ekert-Jaffe), presented at the European Society for Population Economics, Verona, June 2006
- “Far Above Rubies: The Association between Bride Price and Extramarital Sexual Relations in Uganda” (with David Bishai), presented at the European Society for Population Economics, Verona, June 2006
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
- "An Economic Analysis of Co-Parenting Choices: Single Parent, Visiting Father, Cohabitation, Marriage" (with Ronald Mincy, Columbia University and Chien-Chung Huang), May 2005.
- "A Note on Why Fewer Women are Retiring Early." Center for Public Economics Working Paper 98-01, San Diego State University.

CITATION COUNT FOR PAPERS WITH 40 OR MORE CITES (based mostly on SSCI and Google Scholar)


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**EXHIBIT "B"**  
**TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF**  
**SHOSHANA GROSSBARD**  
**JULY 16, 2010**

This is Exhibit "B" referred to in the  
affidavit of Shoshana Grossbard  
made before me on July 16, 2010

  
Notary Public for San Diego  
County, California, USA

7-16-2010



## Report on Polygamy

### A. Introduction

*a. Definitions and assumptions.* Polygamy consists of either polygyny (many wives) or polyandry (many husbands). In this report we interpret 'polygamy' as equivalent to polygyny.

b. In the following economic analysis it is assumed that marriage organizes household production involving the work of wives or husbands, or both. Work in household production includes giving birth, raising children, and taking care of homes (This is not a comprehensive list).

c. At the core of the economic analysis presented in this report is a demand and supply analysis of marriage. Markets originate because brides and grooms can potentially substitute for each other. Markets for marriage are a universal feature.

d. The results of a marriage market analysis depend strongly on whether all participants in marriage markets are free to maximize their own wellbeing. In most societies, marriage markets are heavily regulated and not 'free' markets.

e. The following analysis is in the spirit of 'political economy', in the sense that political institutions affect the functioning of markets. In particular, women's wellbeing will vary as a function of marriage market conditions as well as the ways that men influence marital institutions—such as laws regarding polygamy—as response to market conditions.

### B. Economic analysis

a. *Polygamy causes increased male competition over women.* The economics of marriage was pioneered by University of Chicago economist Gary Becker. When awarding him the Nobel prize, the Swedish academy mentioned Becker's contributions to the economics of the family. It follows from Becker's (1973) demand and supply analysis of marriage markets that when polygamy is permitted, there will be a larger demand for wives. Polygamy does not change the number of women, but allows men to enter the market multiple times, just adding to the demand. As a result, if markets for wives are competitive and allowed to clear at the intersection of demand and supply, the market value of women will rise if polygamy is permitted.

b. *Women don't necessarily capture their increased market value in polygamous societies.* Men have more of an incentive to create institutions that lower women's bargaining power in marriage when women's market value is higher and bargaining may tilt in favor of women. As pointed out in Guttentag and Secord (1983) and Grossbard-Shechtman (1993), the high value of women in marriage markets in polygamous societies is expected to increase men's incentives to control women by

way of political and religious institutions, such as arranged marriages and marriages of minors.

- c. *The more time-intensive household production, the more polygamy is likely to be observed.* Marriage markets are to a large degree markets for women's work in household production. If few commercial goods and services are available for purchase, more of the production burden falls on households. In most societies for which we have data for, women are more likely to perform household production tasks, especially the tasks that most people like to avoid when their income increases (such as cleaning and food preparation; see Grossbard, Gimenez and Molina 2009). Such tasks have been called 'female tasks' in the sociological literature (see Phillip Cohen 2004). In economies with a relatively undeveloped commercial sector, men have a larger demand for female tasks and this may translate in the creation of polygamous households involving more than one wife engaging in the work of household production. From this perspective, there is no rationale to legalize polygamy in modern industrialized economies.

### C. Evidence on Institutions associated with polygamy that reduce women's wellbeing

Please note an important caveat regarding all the points in this section. We do not know whether the existence of polygamy caused these institutions, or if causality runs the other way. Furthermore, the association between polygamy and these other institutions could be spurious in the sense that both institutions could be caused by other factors. Nevertheless, it is very revealing that cross-culturally polygamy is associated with a large number of features that seem undesirable either from a strictly female perspective or from the perspective of society's best interest.

- a. *Early marriage.* As documented in Grossbard (1978) women in polygamous societies are more likely to marry young. This is not necessarily the case with men, so polygamous societies are characterized by large age differences between husbands and wives. There is also evidence that women in polygamous households in North America marry at particularly young ages and are substantially younger than their husbands. In turn, early marriage increases the likelihood of early widowhood and financial hardship for women.
- b. *Arranged marriage.* If we compare monogamous countries with countries where polygamy is legal we observe a much higher frequency of arranged marriage in polygamous societies. In particular, large proportions of young couples in Africa and the Indian subcontinent have arranged marriages, and most of the countries in which they live have legalized polygamy. Arranged marriages are undesirable from young adults' point of view in the sense that they interfere with their autonomy in a very important matter. Furthermore, many societies who impose arranged marriages on their children also use violence and the threat of violence to enforce the families' best interest. For example, in Israel all citizens are exposed to modern ideas about love and marriage. Muslims and Druzes have more arranged marriages than Christians and Jews. Most instances of young women found killed by relatives are found in the



Muslim and Druze sector, and typically in the context of women refusing to go along with their family's choice of mate.

- c. *Brideprice is often paid* in polygamous societies. This is payment by the groom for the costs of obtaining a bride. Sometimes it is also called 'bridewealth'. This means that grooms pay part of the expected value of a woman's work in household production upfront to the woman's relatives instead of women experiencing the benefit of their high value after marriage (see Becker 1981, Grossbard-Shechtman 1978, 1993). Such redistribution of surplus value hurts women and benefits men of an older generation. If more of the rewards for women's work consists of a monetary transfer to the women's guardian there may also be less of need for men to provide emotional rewards in marriage. Furthermore, women may also suffer the consequences of the institution of a refundable brideprice, as is the case in Uganda. It has been found that when brideprice is refundable there are stricter standards of fidelity for women imposed on women than on men (see Bishai and Grossbard, forthcoming). This creates a sense of unfairness in marriage.
- d. *Divorce*. One observes an association between easy divorce and polygamy (Grossbard-Shechtman 1993). For example, the Kanuris of Nigeria have very easy divorce and high rates of polygamy. Divorce tends to be relatively easy to perform in Muslim societies, and these societies are also typically accepting polygamy. In the case of Judaism, when rabbis outlawed polygamy in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, they also gave more protection to women at divorce (Grossbard 1986). One possible reason why the two institutions tend to go hand in hand is that society is less concerned about the repercussions of divorce to women in terms of single status and poverty when polygamy is legal and remarriage is easier for women. Whereas easier remarriage is an advantage for women, easier divorce tends to be disadvantageous to women. In a recent context, it was observed that women's property settlements went down after the introduction of no-fault divorce in California (Becker 1981). No-fault divorce made divorce easier.
- e. *Female circumcision*. Many of the same societies that have polygamy also have female circumcision (also called female genital mutilation), an institution that reduces women's potential for a happy married life (Han 2002). In communities where polygamy is prominent, female circumcision is partially intended as a tool to curb women's sex drive, thus easing the pressure on the husband to satisfy all of his wives sexually. (see Rahman & Toubia 2000). In polygamous societies women have been found to justify the custom of female circumcision based on the belief that circumcision increases the sexual pleasure of men and therefore reduces the chance of their husband taking another wife (Gruenbaum. 2001).
- f. *Purdah, the seclusion of women*. Many Muslim societies, including Saudi Arabia and the Kanuris of Nigeria, practice both purdah and polygamy (more on the practice among the Kanuris is found in Ronald Cohen 1971). The institution of purdah limits women's freedom of movement and typically means that women don't participate in the labor force. This makes them more dependent on their husbands financially. The

Canadian polygamous society of Bountiful does not have 'purdah' but it remains distanced from the rest of Canadian society (Campbell 2005).

- g. *Low emphasis on the emotional side of marriage.* Many polygynous societies discourage romantic love. For example, this is the case among the Kanuris (Ronald Cohen 1971). This de-emphasis of romantic love is likely to hurt women more than men, as women typically place more emphasis on romantic love in their revealed consumption preferences in democratic societies offering a variety of books and movies. For example, most readers of Harlequin romantic novels are women.
- h. *Jealousy.* Within polygamous societies it has been observed that polygamy is associated with high levels of jealousy among co-wives (Al-Krenawi et al. 1997, 2001). This makes sense to the extent that men in polygamous households divide their attention among more than one wife.
- i. *Surveys.* When interviewed, women in both Mali and South Africa—countries where polygamy is prevalent—said they look favorably upon polygamy (Dangor 2001, Madhavan 2002).
- j. *Psychological health problems.* Polygamy has been associated with psychological distress. Al-Krenawi et al (2001) report that senior wives expressed great distress when their husbands took another wife.

**D. Institutions found in polygamous societies aimed at alleviating the problems caused by polygamy: indirect recognition that there are such problems.**

- a. *Prohibition on number of wives.* Most societies allowing polygamy limit the number of wives that are allowed per husband. Many of them follow the Islam's rule limiting the number of wives to four. Implicitly, this recognizes that polygamy can be detrimental and needs to be restricted. The harm caused by polygamy does not necessarily fall on women. It could also fall on men who may find it difficult to secure a wife when they have to compete with potential polygamists.
- b. *Rotation.* It is the custom among the Kanuris of Nigeria that a husband rotates among his wives: he takes turns sleeping in each wife's home following a fixed schedule that allocates equal time to each wife. Such regulation appears to be the result of the wives' suffering from their husband's attention being divided among multiple wives.
- c. *Encouragement of cooperation* in household production among the various wives in an African society that I studied, the Kanuris of Nigeria. This is an implicit recognition that there is a tendency for co-wives to fight with each other. Giving supervisory authority to the senior wife is one way conflicts among co-wives are reduced (see Gage-Brandon 1992).
- d. *Separate dwellings* for each wife, possibly meaning that one wife is in the country and one in the city (Clignet and Sween 1974).

- e. *Sororal polygyny.* Sisters may be less likely to fight with each other than unrelated co-wives. Murdock (1949) found that 70 of the 193 polygynous societies he surveyed had sororal polygyny.

**E. Other undesirable consequence of polygamy and undesirable results for children**

- a. *Widowhood.* Wives of polygamists are more likely to be widowed young, as polygamists are often considerably older than they are.
- b. *Children's human capital.* Polygamist men tend to spend their money on having more children and investing little in their education, as opposed to having fewer children with higher levels of human capital (Gould et al xx).
- c. *More health problems in children.* A cross-sectional association between polygyny and child mortality has been documented by Amey (2002) and Gyimah (2009).

**F. Potential Unintended consequence for Canada**

Were Canada to legalize polygamy, one expects

- a. Canadian women willing to live in polygamous households are likely to have low education, men are likely to have higher than average income so they can afford multiple wives (Wives of polygamists tend to be less educated than monogamous wives according to Grossbard-Shechtman 1993). The disparity between husbands and wives is likely to be associated with more male control over women's lives.
- b. Women may live with the constant threat of being reduced to the second wife position (see M'Salha 2001).
- c. More competition for scarce women on the part of men, leaving many men unmarried. It is the possible discontent of poor men that may have contributed to the demise of polygamy in the West (see Grossbard-Shechtman 1980).

**G. Concluding assessment**

a. In the cultures and societies worldwide that have embraced it, polygamy is associated with undesirable economic, societal, physical, and emotional factors related to women's wellbeing. The natural economic consequence of polygamy is increased market value for women, though the women themselves do not realize the economic benefit of their greater value. Rather, women tend to be treated more like commodities in polygamous societies, and their freedom to manage their own economic circumstance and destiny is reduced. This loss of control by women in polygamous civilizations is seen in the early and arranged marriages, which are so prevalent, along with the practice of paying a brideprice. Easy exits from marriage by the way of simple divorce proceedings add to women's undesirable circumstances observed in polygamous societies. The physical and emotional distress associated with the polygamy way of life is no less devastating. The practice of female

circumcision amongst polygamous peoples is self-evident in terms of its inflicted pain, as is the emotional detachment, jealousy, and absence of genuine emotional love associated with the practice.

b. It is common within polygamous communities that wives are widowed young because of age disparities between wives and their husbands. Polygamous households also demonstrate lower overall levels of education and greater proportional amounts of health problems.

c. Many of the societies that have tolerated the practice of polygamy simultaneously recognize its harm. For example, some polygamous cultures limit the number of wives that a man may take. Also, traditions like regular rotations by the husband through and amongst multiple wives as well as separate residences demonstrate an acknowledgment of the harm being inflicted upon the women.

d. It has not been proven scientifically that the association observed between polygamy and any of the undesirable individual social features mentioned above is caused by the institution of polygamy. Nevertheless, the list of undesirable social features is so long that it is hard to escape the conclusion that some of these results are caused by the institution of polygamy. If only part of the undesirable results mentioned above will follow from the legalization of polygamy in Canada, it is sufficient reason to strongly oppose a legalized polygamy that may cause significant harm to women, children, and the men who love them. Furthermore, men may suffer undesirable consequences as increased competition for women may increase the number of involuntarily unmarried men.

e. Based on my experience, research and writing regarding the practice of polygamy around the world, my opinion is that Canada has a significant interest in prohibiting the practice of polygamy.

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