“Hearts, Minds” & Development
Recent Research Challenges the Model

February 2011, Santa Fe Institute

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This research is supported by a DoD Minerva grant “Terrorism, Governance and Development”
and grants from the Department of Homeland Security and the National Science Foundation
“Hearts, Minds” & Development
Recent Research Challenges the Model

ALLIES
- Support

GOVERNMENT
- Suppression/COIN

REBELS
- Attacks

SERVICES
- Personal Security
- Dispute Adjudication & Justice
- Education
- Health
- Infrastructure
- Representation

CIVILIAN POPULATION
- Services
- Civilian Casualties
- Information/Tips (Taxes)
Provision of Aid/Services

  Reconstruction spending was violence-reducing in Iraq, but only small scale projects and only post-surge
- Berman and Tiffany Chou. (Preliminary) Non-results in Afghanistan. 2011. No measured effect of reconstruction spending on violence in Afghanistan (USAID LGCD, MRRD, CERP)

Jobs, Income and other Grievances? Probably Not


These findings reinforce existing literature which emphasizes that the key role of civilians in asymmetric insurgency is in providing or withholding information about local insurgent activity.
Rebel-Civilian Interaction

Rebels, Clubs, and Provision of Services

- Survey in West Bank (under construction, 2011).
- Berman, Radical, Religious and Violent, MIT Press, 2009. Radical Religious “Clubs” are excellent service providers and adept insurgents and terrorists, when they chose to rebel

Support for Militant Groups

- Safe polling methods on attitudes toward violent extremists; Educated, middle class support for violent Islamists, perhaps as a source of political opposition

Civilian Autonomy


Domesticating Rebels

- Heger. “Taming the Armalite…” UCSD, 2010. IRA reduced violence once electorate could sanction it

GOVERNMENT

Suppression/COIN

Attacks

REBELS

Information/Tips? (Taxes)

Services

Services

CIVILIAN POPULATION

Personal Security
Dispute Adjudication
(Education)
(Health)
(Representation)
Civilian Responses to Violence

- Condra, Felter, Radha Iyengar, and Shapiro. “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq....” 2010. Civilian casualties by allies predict increased attacks vs. allied forces; Civilian casualties by insurgents predict decreased attacks on allied forces, but only in mixed areas.


Instrumental violence targeting civilians

- Heger. “In the Crosshairs...” Worldwide, violence against civilians is directed against targets most likely to influence governments.

- Steele, Abbey. “Unsettling...” Yale Paramilitary violence against civilians in Colombia appears to be ethnic cleansing.
Why is Governance so Poor?

- Given evidence for “competitive governance” model, why are local governments such corrupt and inept service providers?
  Corruption as a regime-preservation strategy

What to do About It?

- Other techno-clever IT-intensive anti-corruption monitoring techniques?

How is the Model Doing?

- Multiple sources of evidence that civilian decisions are consequential to counterinsurgency
- New evidence weighs against an employment-based or grievance-based interpretation of what those consequential decisions are, leaving the classic “information flow” model
- We cannot yet say if aid in Afghanistan is violence-reducing or not, but preliminary findings show no evidence that it is
  - We are currently attempting to understand why
  - We clearly need a better model of how aid builds governance in failed states
Implications for Allies (tentative)

Analogy to Motivation of Complexity Theory

- If we had unlimited computing resources, what types of problems are still difficult?
- If we had unlimited development and military resources under what conditions is counterinsurgency still difficult?
- In any “competitive governance” model, forward-looking civilians will want to see sustainable governance in order to support government, no matter what the model of civilian support for government is. Aid programs should not affect civilian support for government if
  a. they are not sustainable
  b. they are not conditional on behavior
- Understanding the nature civilian support for govt. is critical to optimal deployment:
  - if tips complement COIN and COIN complements development, then the return to applying both COIN and development resources is relatively low in areas not predisposed to tip (i.e., that oppose government control)
  # contradicts conventional military theory of striking enemy at strongest point; but consistent with classic COIN theory of patient ink-blot progression from easy to hard territory.
  - e.g., Palestinian Authority success vs. Hamas since 2007

Further Reading: igcc.ucsd.edu/DACOR

Full references follow
Government-Civilian Interaction (full references)

Provision of Aid/Services

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