

# **“Hearts, Minds” & Development**

## **Recent Research Challenges the Model**

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
**GOVERNMENT**

**REBELS**


**CIVILIAN  
POPULATION**

# “Hearts, Minds” & Development

## Recent Research Challenges the Model



# Government-Civilian Interaction



## *Provision of Aid/Services*

- Berman, Felter, Shapiro. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought?..." 2009 Reconstruction spending was violence-reducing in Iraq, but only small scale projects and only post-surge
- Crost, Benjamin, Patrick B. Johnston and Joseph Felter "Aid Under Fire..." 2011. Development projects increase violence on announcement in rural Philippines.
- Berman and Tiffany Chou. (Preliminary) Non-results in Afghanistan. 2011. No measured effect of reconstruction spending on violence in Afghanistan (USAID LGCD, MRRD, CERP)

## *Jobs, Income and other Grievances? Probably Not*

- Berman, Callen, Felter, and Shapiro. "Do Working Men Rebel?..." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (forthcoming), increased unemployment associated with decreased violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and Philippines
- Condra, Luke. "The Perils of the Periphery..." African ethnic group rebellion associated with high income and distance from capital. UCSD Working Paper, 2011.

*These findings reinforce existing literature which emphasizes that the key role of civilians in asymmetric insurgency is in providing or withholding information about local insurgent activity.*

# Rebel-Civilian Interaction

## Rebels, Clubs, and Provision of Services

- Heger, Lindsay. "Insurgents in Neighborhoods": UCSD, 2011. IRA provided security, adjudicated disputes in controlled nbhds.
- Keister, Jennifer. "The Political Economy of Rebel Governance: UCSD, 2011. MILF and MNLF provide security, adjudicate disputes
- Survey in West Bank (under construction, 2011).
- Berman and Laitin "Religion, Terrorism and Public Goods..." *Journal of Public Economics*, 2008.
- Berman, *Radical, Religious and Violent*, MIT Press, 2009. Radical Religious "Clubs" are excellent service providers and adept insurgents and terrorists, when they chose to rebel
- Lessing, Benjamin. "The Danger of Dungeons" Berkeley 2010. Brazilian prison gangs behave like "clubs" in many ways

## Support for Militant Groups


- Fair, Christine and Jacob Shapiro. "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan." *International Security*, 2010  
Safe polling methods on attitudes toward violent extremists;  
Educated, middle class support for violent Islamists, perhaps as a source of political opposition

## Civilian Autonomy


- Kaplan, Oliver. "Civilian Autonomy in Civil War." Stanford PhD thesis, Resilient communities can insulate themselves from conflict
- Egel, Daniel. "Tribal Heterogeneity in Yemen" UCSD 2011. Yemeni Tribes as Local Public Goods providers

## Domesticating Rebels

- Heger. "Taming the Armalite..." UCSD, 2010.  
IRA reduced violence once electorate could sanction it



# Civilian and Violence



## *Civilian Responses to Violence*


- Condra, Felter, Radha Iyengar, and Shapiro. “The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq...” 2010.  
Civilian casualties by allies predict increased attacks vs. allied forces; Civilian casualties by insurgents predict decreased attacks on allied forces, but only in mixed areas.
- Shapiro and Nils B. Weidmann. 2011. “Talking about Killing...”  
Cellphone coverage increases insurgent violence in Iraq.

## *Instrumental violence targeting civilians*

- Heger. “In the Crosshairs...”  
Worldwide, violence against civilians is directed against targets most likely to influence governments.
- Steele, Abbey. “Unsettling...” Yale  
Paramilitary violence against civilians in Colombia appears to be ethnic cleansing.

# ALLIES

# Quality of Governance



## Why is Governance so Poor?

- Given evidence for “competitive governance” model, why are local governments such corrupt and inept service providers?
- Isaqzadeh, Mohammad. “Prebendalism and the Afghan National Police... Politics and Post-Conflict Police Reform.” Oxford 2009  
Corruption as a regime-preservation strategy

## What to do About It?


- Callen and James Long. “Does Election Monitoring Reduce Fraud? Lessons from Afghanistan.” UCSD 2011: Vote fraud significantly reduced by cellphone pictures of provisional vote tallies
- Other techno-clever IT-intensive anti-corruption monitoring techniques?

## How is the Model Doing?

- Multiple sources of evidence that civilian decisions are consequential to counterinsurgency
- New evidence weighs against an employment-based or grievance-based interpretation of what those consequential decisions are, leaving the classic “information flow” model
- We cannot yet say if aid in Afghanistan is violence-reducing or not, but preliminary findings show no evidence that it is
  - We are currently attempting to understand why
  - We clearly need a better model of how aid builds governance in failed states

# ALLIES

## Implications for Allies (tentative)




### Analogy to Motivation of Complexity Theory

- If we had unlimited computing resources, what types of problems are still difficult?
- If we had unlimited development and military resources under what conditions is counterinsurgency still difficult?
- In any “competitive governance” model, forward-looking civilians will want to see *sustainable governance* in order to support government, no matter what the model of civilian support for government is. Aid programs should not affect civilian support for government if
  - a. they are not sustainable
  - b. they are not conditional on behavior
- Understanding the nature civilian support for govt. is critical to optimal deployment:
  - if tips complement COIN and COIN complements development, then the return to applying both COIN and development resources is relatively low in areas not predisposed to tip (i.e., that oppose government control)
  - # contradicts conventional military theory of striking enemy at strongest point; but consistent with classic COIN theory of patient ink-blot progression from easy to hard territory.
  - e.g., Palestinian Authority success vs. Hamas since 2007

Further Reading: [igcc.ucsd.edu/DACOR](http://igcc.ucsd.edu/DACOR)

Full references follow

# Government-Civilian Interaction (full references)



## *Provision of Aid/Services*

- Berman, Eli, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *NBER Working Paper 14606*. December 2009.
- Crost, Benjamin, Patrick B. Johnston and Joseph Felter. "Aid Under Fire: Development Projects and Civil Conflict.", UC Berkeley mimeo, 2011.
- Berman, Eli and Tiffany Chou. (preliminary) Non-results in Afghanistan. 2011.
- Douglass, Rex. 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds be Bought in an Ideological Civil War? Evidence from the Vietnam War." Working Paper. 2011.

## *Jobs, Income and other Grievances? Probably Not*

- Berman, Eli, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (forthcoming).
- Condra, Luke N. "The Perils of the Periphery: Explaining African Ethnic Group Rebellion, 1980-2006." Working Paper. February 2011.



# Rebel-Civilian Interaction (full references)

## Rebels, Clubs, and Provision of Services

- Heger, Lindsay. "Insurgents in Neighborhoods: An Investigation of Rebel Tactics throughout Northern Ireland." Working Paper, UCSD, 2011.
- Keister, Jennifer. "The Political Economy of Rebel Governance: Coercion, Public Goods, and Ideology." Ph.D. Dissertation. UCSD, 2011.
- Survey in West Bank (under construction, 2011).
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- Berman, *Radical, Religious and Violent*, MIT Press, 2009.
- Lessing, Benjamin. "The Danger of Dungeons: Gangs and Armed Groups in Prison" in *Small Arms Survey 2010*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

## Support for Militant Groups


- Fair, C. Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Islam, Militancy, and Politics in Pakistan: Insights from a National Sample." *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 2010.
- Fair, C. Christine and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan." *International Security* 34, no. 3 (Winter 2010): 79-118.
- Fair, C. Christine, Neil Malhotra, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "The Roots of Militancy: Explaining Support for Political Violence in Pakistan." Working Paper. March 11, 2010.
- Lyall, Jason. "Blame Attribution and Support for Combatants during Civil War: Evidence from an Experiment in Afghanistan." Working Paper.

## Civilian Autonomy


- Kaplan, Oliver. "Civilian Autonomy in Civil War." Ph.D. Dissertation. Stanford University.
- Egel, Daniel. "Tribal Heterogeneity and the Allocation of Development Resources." Working Paper. January 25, 2011.

## Domesticating Rebels

- Matanock, Aila M. "Reformed or Reconfigured? Explaining Why Militant Groups Participate in Elections." Ph.D. Dissertation. Stanford University.
- Heger, Lindsay. "Taming the Armalite with the Ballot Box: The IRA's Transformation in Northern Ireland." Working Paper, UCSD, 2010.



# Civilian Reaction to Violence (full references)




## *Civilian Responses to Violence*

- Condra, Luke N., Joseph H. Felter, Radha Iyengar, and Jacob N. Shapiro. "The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq." *NBER Working Paper 16152*. October 14, 2010.
- Condra, Luke N. and Jacob N. Shapiro. "Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage." Working Paper. November 3, 2010.
- Lyall, Jason. "Death from Above: U.S. Airstrikes, Aid, and the Conditionality of Violence in Iraq, 2004-08." Working Paper.
- Lyall, Jason. "State Coercion and Civilian Victimization in Civil War: Evidence from Airstrikes in Afghanistan." Working Paper.
- Douglass, Rex. "Do Civilians Drive the Violence of Civil War? Patterns of Assassination and Terrorism in the Vietnam War." Working Paper. 2010.
- Douglass, Rex. "Does Violence Against Civilians Come Before or After Military Victory? Changing Patterns of Territorial Control and Violence during the Vietnam War." Working Paper. 2010.
- Shapiro, Jacob N. and Nils B. Weidmann. "Talking about Killing: Cell Phones, Collective Action, and Insurgent Violence in Iraq." Working Paper. February 14, 2011.
- Heger, Lindsay. "In the Crosshairs: Explaining Violence against Civilians." Ph.D. Dissertation. UCSD.
- Steele, Abbey. "Unsettling: Displacement during Civil Wars." Ph.D. Dissertation. Yale University.

# ALLIES

## Implications for Allies (full references)



### *Why is Governance so Poor?*

- Isaqzadeh, Mohammad. "Prebendalism and the Afghan National Police: Re-Examining the Relation between Politics and Post-Conflict Police Reform." M.A. Thesis. Oxford University.

### *What to do About It?*

- Callen, Michael and Nils B. Weidmann. "Violence, Control, and Election Fraud: Evidence from the 2009 Afghan Presidential Election." Working Paper.
- Callen, Michael and James Long. "Does Election Monitoring Reduce Fraud? Lessons from Afghanistan." Working Paper, 2011.
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